a. Provide role-based security and privacy training to personnel with the following roles and responsibilities: [Assignment: organization-defined roles and responsibilities]: 1. Before authorizing access to the system, information, or performing assigned duties, and [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter; and 2. When required by system changes; b. Update role-based training content [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]; and c. Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security or privacy incidents into role-based training.
| ID | Name | Description | D3FEND | |
| CM0041 | User Training | Human factors represent one of the most consistently exploited attack vectors against space mission systems; adversaries routinely use spear phishing, social engineering, and other user-interaction techniques to gain initial access to mission networks, development environments, and operational infrastructure. User training reduces this attack surface by building personnel awareness of adversary techniques and the behaviors required to recognize and resist them. Training must be role-differentiated: general security awareness training is required for all personnel with access to mission systems, while personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities require additional role-based training commensurate with the specific duties and access rights they hold. Training must be completed before a user is granted access to mission systems or authorized to perform assigned security duties; updated when system changes introduce new threats, procedures, or access controls that alter the security context in which personnel operate; and refreshed at least annually, or more frequently if the mission's security policy specifies a shorter interval. Training program effectiveness should be measurable, with completion records maintained and knowledge validation incorporated to confirm that training objectives are being achieved rather than simply delivered. | D3-OAM D3-ORA | |
| ID | Description | |
| SV-MA-7 |
Exploit ground system and use to maliciously to interact with the spacecraft |
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| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SPR-292 | The [organization] shall ensure that role-based security-related training is provided to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities: (i) before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties; (ii) when required by system changes; and (iii) at least annually thereafter.{SV-AC-4}{AT-3,CP-2} | Personnel must understand role-specific responsibilities. Tailored training reduces misuse. Continuous reinforcement maintains awareness. Human factors are central to defense. |
| SPR-340 | The [organization] shall determine the mission-specific role security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of [organization] and the systems to which personnel have authorized access.{SV-AC-4}{AT-3} | Different roles carry different risk exposure. Tailored training ensures personnel understand mission-specific responsibilities. Context-driven education strengthens compliance. Role clarity reduces misuse risk. |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| IA-0009 | Trusted Relationship | Adversaries obtain first execution by riding connections that the mission already trusts, formal interconnections with partners, vendors, and user communities. Once a third party is compromised, the actor inherits that entity’s approved routes into mission enclaves: VPNs and jump hosts into ground networks, API keys into cloud tenants, automated file drops that feed command or update pipelines, and collaboration spaces where procedures and dictionaries circulate. Because traffic, credentials, and artifacts originate from known counterparts, the initial execution event can appear as a routine payload task, scheduled procedure, or software update promoted through established processes. | |
| IA-0009.03 | User Segment | The “user segment” encompasses end users and their equipment that interact with mission services, SATCOM terminals, customer ground gateways, tasking portals, and downstream processing pipelines for delivered data. Where these environments interconnect with mission cores, a compromised user domain becomes a springboard. Attackers can inject malformed tasking requests that propagate into payload scheduling, craft user-plane messages that traverse gateways into control or management planes, or seed data products that flow back to mission processing systems and automation. In broadband constellations and hosted services, user terminals may share infrastructure with TT&C or provider management networks, creating opportunities to pivot from customer equipment into provider-run nodes that the spacecraft trusts. | |