| SPR-2 |
The [spacecraft] shall ensure that sensitive information can only be accessed by personnel with appropriate roles and an explicit need for such information to perform their duties.{SV-CF-3,SV-AC-4}{AC-3(11),CM-12}
|
Space system sensitive information can include a wide range of candidate material: functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of link segment protections subject to disabling/bypassing, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and mission operations.
|
| SPR-3 |
The [spacecraft] shall enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the platform and between interconnected systems so that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted. Flow control shall be implemented in conjunction with protected processing domains, security‑policy filters with fully enumerated formats, and a default‑deny communications baseline.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(2),AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-3,CA-3(6),CA-3(7),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}
|
Spacecraft operate in constrained and deterministic environments where uncontrolled data flows can enable data exfiltration, cross-domain leakage, or lateral movement between subsystems. Enforcing approved authorizations with enumerated formats and a default-deny posture ensures only explicitly permitted communications occur. Encryption enforcement at platform boundaries prevents unauthorized disclosure of telemetry or state information.
|
| SPR-4 |
The [spacecraft] security implementation shall ensure that information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by the system.{SV-AC-6,SV-MA-3,SV-SP-7}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(29),SC-16,SC-32}
|
Strict partitioning prevents compromise of one application from cascading into mission-critical subsystems. Many spacecraft attacks exploit flat architectures where subsystems implicitly trust one another. Explicit inter-partition authorization limits lateral movement and privilege escalation. This supports containment and fault isolation under both cyber and fault conditions.
|
| SPR-7 |
The [organization] shall document and design a security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates the [organization]s defined safeguards to the indicated locations and layers: [Examples include: operating system abstractions and hardware mechanisms to the separate processors in the platform, internal components, and the FSW].{SV-MA-6}{CA-9,PL-7,PL-8,PL-8(1),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}
|
Spacecraft security cannot rely on a single control; layered defenses reduce the likelihood of catastrophic compromise. Documenting safeguard allocation across hardware, OS, firmware, and FSW ensures coverage across attack surfaces. This supports resiliency against both cyber intrusion and supply chain weaknesses. Clear documentation enables verification and independent assessment.
|
| SPR-8 |
The [organization] shall ensure that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.{SV-MA-6}{CA-7(5),PL-7,PL-8(1),SA-8(19)}
|
Independent controls that operate in isolation may create security gaps or conflicting behaviors. Coordinated safeguards ensure that encryption, authentication, partitioning, and monitoring functions reinforce each other rather than undermine availability or safety. This reduces bypass risk and improves fault/cyber response integration. Cohesive operation is essential for resilient mission assurance.
|
| SPR-9 |
The [organization] shall implement a security architecture and design that provides the required security functionality, allocates security controls among physical and logical components, and integrates individual security functions, mechanisms, and processes together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.{SV-MA-6}{PL-7,SA-2,SA-8,SA-8(1),SA-8(2),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SC-32,SC-32(1)}
|
Security functionality must be intentionally distributed across physical and logical components rather than bolted on post-design. A unified architecture prevents inconsistent enforcement, duplicated controls, or unprotected interfaces. Integrated design reduces attack surface and improves verification of mission-critical protections.
|
| SPR-10 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),IA-5,IA-5(6),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-28(3)}
|
Authenticators (keys, tokens, counters, certificates) are primary targets for persistent access attacks. Disclosure or modification enables command spoofing, replay, and privilege escalation. Protecting authenticator content preserves command integrity and prevents adversaries from maintaining covert control. Integrity protections must apply both at rest and in use.
|
| SPR-11 |
The [spacecraft] encryption key handling shall be handled outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(1),SC-28(3)}
|
Key management separated from modifiable flight software reduces exposure to software compromise. If keys are accessible to onboard applications, malicious code could extract or misuse them. Hardware-anchored or externally managed key handling reduces persistence risk. This supports trust-chain assurance and mitigates firmware-level compromise.
|
| SPR-12 |
The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that the onboard software is not able to access the information for key readout.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}
|
Even privileged software must not be able to retrieve plaintext keys. Preventing readout mitigates malware harvesting and insider misuse. Key usage should be mediated through cryptographic modules rather than direct exposure. This enforces least privilege at the cryptographic boundary.
|
| SPR-13 |
The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}
|
Telecommand paths are high-value targets for adversarial exploitation. Allowing keys to be retrieved via command interfaces creates a catastrophic failure mode. This constraint prevents exfiltration even under partial compromise of command processing logic. It ensures encryption protections cannot be remotely dismantled.
|
| SPR-14 |
The [spacecraft] shall authenticate the ground station (and all commands) and other spacecraft before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(2),AC-17(10),AC-18(1),AC-20,IA-3(1),IA-4,IA-4(9),IA-7,IA-9,SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-9(2),SC-7(11),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-23(3),SI-3(9)}
|
Authorization can include embedding opcodes in command strings, using trusted authentication protocols, identifying proper link characteristics such as emitter location, expected range of receive power, expected modulation, data rates, communication protocols, beamwidth, etc.; and tracking command counter increments against expected values.
|
| SPR-15 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{AC-3,AC-20,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-23(3),SC-40(3),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
|
Adversaries may attempt imitative RF signals to inject commands or manipulate spacecraft behavior. Signal parameter validation (modulation, power, timing, waveform characteristics) strengthens command authentication beyond cryptographic validation alone. This helps mitigate spoofing, replay, and rogue emitter attacks. RF-layer validation complements cryptographic controls.
|
| SPR-16 |
The [spacecraft] shall ensure that processes reusing a shared system resource (e.g., registers, main memory, secondary storage) do not have access to information (including encrypted representations of information) previously stored in that resource after formal release, by clearing or zeroizing the resource prior to reuse.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(19),SC-4,SI-3}
|
Residual data in memory or registers can create covert channels or leakage paths between partitions. Zeroization prevents recovery of sensitive data by subsequent processes. This mitigates cross-domain leakage and memory scraping attacks. Clearing encrypted remnants is equally important to prevent cryptanalytic exploitation.
|
| SPR-17 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of all information at rest using cryptography.{SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)}
|
* The intent as written is for all transmitted traffic to be protected. This includes internal to internal communications and especially outside of the boundary.
|
| SPR-18 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission, transmission, and reception, in accordance with the [organization]‑provided encryption matrix.{SV-AC-7}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-16,SC-16(1),SC-40}
|
* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
|
| SPR-19 |
The [spacecraft] shall encrypt all telemetry on downlink regardless of operating mode to protect current state of spacecraft.{SV-CF-4}{AC-3(10),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-13}
|
Telemetry exposes real-time spacecraft state and configuration. Unencrypted telemetry can reveal vulnerabilities, operational status, or targeting information. Enforcing encryption across all modes prevents intelligence collection and mission state inference. This mitigates passive RF interception threats.
|
| SPR-20 |
The [spacecraft] shall prevent use of a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled; encryption and authentication shall remain enabled even when automated access control mechanisms are overridden.{SV-AC-1,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{AC-3(10),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40,SC-40(4)}
|
Emergency or override modes often become attack vectors if protections are weakened. Cryptography must remain enforced even during safe-mode or degraded operations. Removing encryption capability creates a single-point catastrophic exposure. Persistent protection ensures no operational shortcut undermines mission assurance.
|
| SPR-21 |
The [spacecraft], when transferring information between different security domains, shall implement security‑policy filters that require fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4(14),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-16,SI-10}
|
Fully enumerated formats prevent injection of malformed or malicious data across security domains. This reduces parser exploitation, data smuggling, and covert channel abuse. Strict domain filtering supports deterministic and auditable inter-domain communication. Only explicitly defined data structures should be permitted.
|
| SPR-22 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement boundary protections to separate bus, communications, and payload components supporting their respective functions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),CA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(14),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-2(2),SC-7(13),SC-7(21),SC-7(29),SC-16(3),SC-32,SI-3,SI-4(13),SI-4(25)}
|
Flat architectures allow compromise of one subsystem to impact all others. Segregated boundaries reduce lateral movement and mission degradation. Isolation ensures payload compromise does not impact TT&C or bus control. This supports containment and survivability.
|
| SPR-23 |
The [spacecraft] shall isolate mission critical functionality from non-mission critical functionality.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),CA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(19),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-3,SC-3(4),SC-7(13),SC-7(29),SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3,SI-7(10),SI-7(12)}
|
Non-critical functions often expand attack surface. Isolation prevents less-trusted components from affecting propulsion, attitude control, or power systems. This reduces cascading failure risk under compromise. Mission-critical systems must maintain operational continuity.
|
| SPR-24 |
The [spacecraft] data within partitioned applications shall not be read or modified by other applications/partitions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-6,SC-32}
|
Application partitions must enforce strict read/write controls to prevent unauthorized state modification. Without this control, malicious code can alter mission parameters or falsify telemetry. Isolation protects integrity of subsystem data and prevents corruption propagation.
|
| SPR-25 |
The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized access to system resources by employing an efficient capability based object model that supports both confinement and revocation of these capabilities when the platform security deems it necessary.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(8),IA-4(9),PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-16,SC-32,SI-3}
|
Capability models restrict access to explicit, revocable tokens of authority. This enforces least privilege and supports dynamic revocation under threat conditions. Confinement reduces damage radius of compromised processes. Revocation capability enables adaptive cyber response.
|
| SPR-26 |
The [spacecraft] shall use protected processing domains to enforce the policy that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted as a basis for flow‑control decisions and shall enumerate permitted inter‑domain flows and enforce domain‑gate checks on any domain switch. {SV-AC-6}{AC-4(2),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}
|
Domain gates provide controlled transition points between security domains. Enumerated flows prevent unintentional data leakage and enforce encryption policies at boundaries. This mitigates cross-domain injection and exfiltration. Strong gate enforcement prevents privilege escalation during context switching.
|
| SPR-27 |
The [spacecraft] shall define the security functions and security-relevant information for which the system must protect from unauthorized access.{SV-MA-4,SV-MA-6}{AC-6(1),SA-8(19),SC-7(13),SC-16}
|
Clearly identifying security-relevant functions ensures protections are applied to the correct assets. Undefined security boundaries create ambiguity and inconsistent enforcement. Explicit definition supports verification, testing, and threat modeling. This forms the basis for risk-informed control allocation.
|
| SPR-28 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified. The [spacecraft] shall refresh only from cryptographically authenticated [organization]-approved sources.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17}
|
Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved.
|
| SPR-29 |
The [spacecraft] shall enter cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-17}
|
|
| SPR-30 |
The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17}
|
|
| SPR-31 |
The [spacecraft] shall fail securely to a secondary device in the event of an operational failure of a primary boundary protection device (i.e., crypto solution).{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{CP-13,SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-7(18),SI-13,SI-13(4)}
|
If a primary boundary protection device fails, the spacecraft must not revert to insecure operation. Secure failover ensures continuity of confidentiality and integrity protections. This prevents adversaries from inducing failure states to bypass encryption. Redundancy strengthens mission resilience.
|
| SPR-32 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)}
|
|
| SPR-33 |
The [spacecraft] shall utilize TRANSEC. TRANSEC shall be implemented and verified as a distinct layer in coordination with Traffic Flow Security and RF anti‑fingerprinting.{SV-AV-1}{CP-8,RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-8(4),SC-16,SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40,SC-40(4)}
|
Transmission Security (TRANSEC) is used to ensure the availability of transmissions and limit intelligence collection from the transmissions. TRANSEC is secured through burst encoding, frequency hopping, or spread spectrum methods where the required pseudorandom sequence generation is controlled by a cryptographic algorithm and key. Such keys are known as transmission security keys (TSK). The objectives of transmission security are low probability of interception (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD), and antijam which means resistance to jamming (EPM or ECCM).
|
| SPR-34 |
The [spacecraft] shall recover to a known cyber-safe state when an anomaly is detected.{IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-10(6),SI-13,SI-17}
|
|
| SPR-35 |
The [spacecraft] shall perform an orderly, controlled system shut-down to a known cyber-safe state upon receipt of a termination command or condition.{PE-11,PE-11(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SI-17}
|
|
| SPR-36 |
The [spacecraft] shall operate securely in off-nominal power conditions, including loss of power and spurious power transients.{SV-AV-6,SV-MA-2}{PE-11,PE-11(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SI-13,SI-17}
|
Power anomalies may induce undefined states exploitable by attackers. Cryptographic and security mechanisms must not degrade into insecure configurations during brownout or transient conditions. This mitigates fault-induced bypass attacks. Resilient operation preserves trust chain continuity.
|
| SPR-37 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information, and shall demonstrate compliance via pre‑launch TEMPEST‑like evaluation for co‑located payload configurations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)}
|
The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus.
|
| SPR-38 |
The [spacecraft] shall be designed so that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)}
|
This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements.
|
| SPR-39 |
The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.{SV-AC-6}{PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4}
|
Shared buses, memory, or peripherals can become covert channels. Controls must prevent unintended information propagation across shared infrastructure. This mitigates cross-partition leakage and data exfiltration. Shared resources must not undermine domain isolation.
|
| SPR-40 |
The [spacecraft] shall only use communication protocols that support encryption within the mission.{SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-40(4)}
|
Protocols lacking encryption create unavoidable exposure. Selecting encryption-capable protocols ensures confidentiality and integrity can be enforced mission-wide. This reduces risk from protocol downgrade attacks.
|
| SPR-41 |
The [spacecraft] shall maintain a separate execution domain for each executing process.{SV-AC-6}{SA-8(14),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(21),SC-39,SI-3}
|
Process isolation prevents one compromised task from impacting others. Separate execution domains mitigate memory corruption and privilege escalation. This strengthens containment of malicious code. Deterministic isolation enhances both safety and cybersecurity.
|
| SPR-42 |
The [spacecraft] flight software shall not be able to tamper with the security policy or its enforcement mechanisms.{SV-AC-6}{SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SC-3,SC-7(13)}
|
Security enforcement must be independent of mission application logic. If FSW can alter policy, adversaries can disable protections post-compromise. This control preserves integrity of access controls and monitoring functions. Separation of enforcement from application reduces systemic risk.
|
| SPR-43 |
The [spacecraft] shall initialize the platform to a known safe state.{SA-8(19),SA-8(23),SA-8(24),SI-17}
|
|
| SPR-44 |
The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception in accordance with [organization] provided encryption matrix.{SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-IT-2}{SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-8(3)}
|
* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
|
| SPR-45 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms that achieve protection against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference; verification evidence for EMI/EPM shall be distinct from EMSEC/TEMPEST, anti‑jam/anti‑spoof protections, and EMP/HANE hardness.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-40,SC-40(1)}
|
Intentional electromagnetic interference may attempt to induce predictable faults or bypass protections. Cryptographic resilience ensures corrupted transmissions are rejected. Verification must distinguish EMI/EPM resilience from TEMPEST and anti-jam protections. This ensures integrity under hostile RF environments.
|
| SPR-46 |
The [spacecraft] shall monitor [Program‑defined telemetry points] for malicious commanding attempts and alert ground operators upon detection.{SV-AC-2,SV-IT-1,SV-DCO-1}{AC-17,AC-17(1),AC-17(10),AU-3(1),RA-10,SC-7,SC-16,SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
|
Telemetry-based detection enables identification of anomalous command patterns, replay attempts, and injection attacks. Early detection allows rapid containment before mission impact escalates. Onboard monitoring is critical when ground latency limits intervention. This supports proactive defense.
|
| SPR-47 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement relay and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for establishing a remote connection.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,IA-2(8),IA-2(9),SA-8(18),SC-8(1),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-23(3),SC-40(4)}
|
Replay attacks can reuse valid command packets to manipulate spacecraft behavior. Freshness checks, nonces, and sequence enforcement prevent reuse of captured transmissions. Relay resistance mitigates man-in-the-middle exploitation. This protects command integrity over RF links.
|
| SPR-48 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit tools.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9(3),RA-10,SC-8(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(24)}
|
Audit logs are essential for attribution and forensic analysis. If adversaries can modify audit data, detection and recovery become unreliable. Cryptographic integrity protections preserve evidentiary value.
|
| SPR-50 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information during transmission unless otherwise protected by approved physical safeguards.{SV-AC-7}{SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(4),SI-7(6)}
|
Unprotected transmission exposes telemetry, commands, and state information to interception or manipulation. Cryptographic protections ensure authenticity and confidentiality across all communication paths. Physical safeguards alone are insufficient in contested environments.
|
| SPR-53 |
The [organization] shall employ automated tools that provide notification to ground operators upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.{CM-3(5),CM-6,IR-6,IR-6(2),SA-8(21),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(2)}
|
|
| SPR-54 |
The [spacecraft] shall retain the capability to update/upgrade operating systems while on-orbit.{SV-SP-7}{SA-4(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3}
|
The operating system updates should be performed using multi-factor authorization and should only be performed when risk of compromise/exploitation of identified vulnerability outweighs the risk of not performing the update.
|
| SPR-55 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide cyber threat status to the ground segment for the Defensive Cyber Operations team, per the governing specification.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-5,PM-16,PM-16(1),RA-3(3),RA-10,SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
|
The future space enterprises will include full-time Cyber Defense teams supporting space mission systems. Their work is currently focused on the ground segment but may eventually require specific data from the space segment for their successful operation. This requirement is a placeholder to ensure that any DCO-related requirements are taken into consideration for this document.
|
| SPR-56 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide automated onboard mechanisms that integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support mission processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities to determine the attack class in the event of a cyber attack.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(1),IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),PM-16(1),RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(22),SC-5(3),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
|
* Identifying the class (e.g., exfiltration, Trojans, etc.), nature, or effect of cyberattack (e.g., exfiltration, subverted control, or mission interruption) is necessary to determine the type of response. The first order of identification may be to determine whether the event is an attack or a non-threat event (anomaly). The objective requirement would be to predict the impact of the detected signature.
* Unexpected conditions can include RF lockups, loss of lock, failure to acquire an expected contact and unexpected reports of acquisition, unusual AGC and ACS control excursions, unforeseen actuator enabling's or actions, thermal stresses, power aberrations, failure to authenticate, software or counter resets, etc. Mitigation might include additional TMONs, more detailed AGC and PLL thresholds to alert operators, auto-capturing state snapshot images in memory when unexpected conditions occur, signal spectra measurements, and expanded default diagnostic telemetry modes to help in identifying and resolving anomalous conditions.
|
| SPR-57 |
The [spacecraft] shall monitor and collect all onboard cyber- data (from multiple system components), including identification of potential attacks and information about the attack for subsequent analysis.{SV-DCO-1}{AC-6(9),AC-20,AC-20(1),AU-2,AU-12,IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(2),SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}
|
The spacecraft will monitor and collect data that provides accountability of activity occurring onboard the spacecraft. Due to resource limitations on the spacecraft, analysis must be performed to determine which data is critical for retention and which can be filtered. Full system coverage of data and actions is desired as an objective; it will likely be impractical due to the resource limitations. “Cyber-relevant data” refers to all data and actions deemed necessary to support accountability and awareness of onboard cyber activities for the mission. This would include data that may indicate abnormal activities, critical configuration parameters, transmissions on onboard networks, command logging, or other such data items. This set of data items should be identified early in the system requirements and design phase. Cyber-relevant data should support the ability to assess whether abnormal events are unintended anomalies or actual cyber threats. Actual cyber threats may rarely or never occur, but non-threat anomalies occur regularly. The ability to filter out cyber threats for non-cyber threats in relevant time would provide a needed capability. Examples could include successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels).
|
| SPR-58 |
The [spacecraft] shall generate cyber related audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, and the outcome of the event. For privileged or hazardous commands, the audit record shall include the approver identifiers and the command identifier.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-3,AU-3(1),AU-12,IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}
|
Detailed audit records are essential for attribution, anomaly detection, and post-incident forensic reconstruction. Capturing what occurred, when, where, and by whom enables rapid differentiation between system fault and adversarial activity. Including approver identifiers for privileged or hazardous commands strengthens accountability and insider threat mitigation. Without complete audit context, recovery and containment decisions may be delayed or misinformed.
|
| SPR-59 |
The [spacecraft] shall attribute cyber attacks and identify unauthorized use of the platform by downlinking onboard cyber information to the mission ground station within [Program‑defined time ≤ 3 minutes].{SV-DCO-1,SV-IT-1,SV-IT-2}{AU-4(1),IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),RA-10,SA-8(22),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(5),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24)}
|
Rapid transmission of cyber-relevant telemetry supports near-real-time ground-based fusion and correlation with enterprise security events. Delayed reporting increases risk of adversary persistence or mission degradation. Early attribution enables containment actions before cascading effects occur. Defined timeliness ensures detection capability aligns with operational tempo.
|
| SPR-60 |
The [spacecraft] shall integrate cyber related detection and responses with existing fault management capabilities to ensure tight integration between traditional fault management and cyber intrusion detection and prevention.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(4),IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(26),SC-3(4),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(16),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-7(7),SI-13}
|
The onboard IPS system should be integrated into the existing onboard spacecraft fault management system (FMS) because the FMS has its own fault detection and response system built in. SV corrective behavior is usually limited to automated fault responses and ground commanded recovery actions. Intrusion prevention and response methods will inform resilient cybersecurity design. These methods enable detected threat activity to trigger defensive responses and resilient SV recovery.
|
| SPR-61 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect information obtained from logging/intrusion-monitoring from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9,AU-9(3),RA-10,SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}
|
Monitoring data is a high-value target for attackers seeking to evade detection or erase traces of compromise. Protecting log integrity preserves evidentiary value and detection continuity. Unauthorized modification or deletion could mask malicious behavior or delay response. Cryptographic protection and access controls ensure monitoring mechanisms cannot be silently disabled.
|
| SPR-62 |
The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17}
|
Cyber-safe mode provides a deterministic fallback posture when compromise or anomalous conditions threaten mission integrity. Restricting non-essential functions reduces attack surface and prevents further propagation of malicious activity. Defined restrictions ensure predictable behavior under cyber stress conditions. This supports survivability and controlled recovery rather than uncontrolled degradation.
|
| SPR-63 |
The [spacecraft] shall be able to locate the onboard origin of a cyber attack and alert ground operators within [Program‑defined time ≤ 3 minutes].{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),RA-10,SA-8(22),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(16),SI-4(24)}
|
The origin of any attack onboard the vehicle should be identifiable to support mitigation. At the very least, attacks from critical element (safety-critical or higher-attack surface) components should be locatable quickly so that timely action can occur.
|
| SPR-64 |
The [spacecraft] shall detect and deny unauthorized outgoing communications posing a threat to the spacecraft.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-5(4),RA-10,SC-7(9),SC-7(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(4),SI-4(7),SI-4(11),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25)}
|
Outbound communications may indicate data exfiltration, covert channels, or compromised subsystem behavior. Monitoring and blocking unauthorized egress prevents leakage of mission data or cryptographic material. Many attacks rely on command-and-control or data extraction channels; egress control disrupts this persistence mechanism. Outbound traffic should be as tightly controlled as inbound command paths.
|
| SPR-65 |
The [spacecraft] shall select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber attacks prior to entering cyber-safe mode.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-4(7),SI-17}
|
These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker exquisitely—with or without ground aiding. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system." These countermeasures are likely executed prior to entering into a cyber-safe mode.
|
| SPR-66 |
The [spacecraft] shall be designed and configured so that encrypted communications traffic and data is visible to on-board security monitoring tools.{SV-DCO-1}{RA-10,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(10),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25)}
|
Encryption must not blind onboard intrusion detection capabilities. Security tools require access to sufficient context (pre-encryption or post-decryption inspection points) to detect malicious patterns. Without visibility, encrypted channels become covert channels. Proper architectural placement ensures both confidentiality and detectability are preserved.
|
| SPR-67 |
The [spacecraft] shall be designed and configured so that spacecraft memory can be monitored by the on-board intrusion detection/prevention capability.{SV-DCO-1}{RA-10,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(24),SI-16}
|
Many spacecraft attacks target memory corruption, firmware modification, or unauthorized process injection. Monitoring memory state enables detection of tampering, abnormal writes, or execution anomalies. Memory visibility supports early detection of wiper malware or boot-level compromise. This is essential for protecting deterministic flight software environments.
|
| SPR-68 |
The [spacecraft] shall have on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-MA-4}{RA-10,SC-7,SI-3,SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
|
The mission critical components or systems could be GNC/Attitude Control, C&DH, TT&C, Fault Management.
|
| SPR-69 |
The [spacecraft] shall alert in the event of the audit/logging processing failures.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2),SI-3,SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24)}
|
Failure of logging mechanisms may signal active tampering or resource exhaustion attacks. Immediate alerting ensures loss of visibility does not go unnoticed. Silent failure of audit systems creates blind spots exploitable by adversaries. Monitoring the monitors is critical to resilient detection.
|
| SPR-70 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide an alert immediately to [at a minimum the mission director, administrators, and security officers] when the following failure events occur: [minimally but not limited to: auditing software/hardware errors; failures in the audit capturing mechanisms; and audit storage capacity reaching 95%, 99%, and 100%] of allocated capacity, including security component failover events; alerts shall include component identity, time, and fault reason.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
|
Intent is to have human on the ground be alerted to failures. This can be decomposed to SV to generate telemetry and to Ground to alert.
|
| SPR-71 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability of a cyber “black-box” to capture necessary data for cyber forensics of threat signatures and anomaly resolution when cyber attacks are detected. The [spacecraft] shall automatically route audit events to the alternate audit logging capability upon primary audit failure and shall resynchronize the alternate store to the primary upon recovery.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5(5),AU-9(2),AU-9(3),AU-12,IR-4(12),IR-4(13),IR-5(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
|
Similar concept of a "black box" on an aircraft where all critical information is stored for post forensic analysis. Black box can be used to record CPU utilization, GNC physical parameters, audit records, memory contents, TT&C data points, etc. The timeframe is dependent upon implementation but needs to meet the intent of the requirement. For example, 30 days may suffice.
|
| SPR-72 |
The [spacecraft] shall automatically notify ground operators when onboard integrity verification detects discrepancies.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(2),SI-7(12)}
|
Integrity check failures may indicate unauthorized modification, corruption, or hardware faults induced by malicious activity. Automatic notification ensures ground teams can rapidly assess risk and initiate recovery procedures. Delay in reporting increases mission impact. Transparency between onboard detection and ground response is essential for coordinated defense.
|
| SPR-73 |
The [spacecraft], upon detection of a potential integrity violation, shall provide the capability to [audit the event and alert ground operators].{SV-DCO-1}{CM-3(5),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(8)}
|
One example would be for bad commands where the system would reject the command and not increment the Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) and include the information in telemetry.
|
| SPR-74 |
The [organization] shall define the security safeguards that are to be automatically employed when integrity violations are discovered.{SV-IT-2}{CP-2,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-7(5),SI-7(8)}
|
Predefined safeguards ensure consistent and timely response to detected integrity violations. Ad hoc response increases uncertainty and recovery time. Automated actions may include isolation, reconstitution from gold images, or transition to cyber-safe mode. Defined response paths improve resilience and reduce operator burden during crisis.
|
| SPR-75 |
The [organization] shall define acceptable secure communication protocols available for use within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}
|
The secure communication protocol should include "strong" authenticated encryption characteristics.
|
| SPR-76 |
The [spacecraft] shall only use [organization]-defined communication protocols within the mission.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}
|
Restricting protocols prevents introduction of undocumented or insecure communication paths. Unapproved protocols may lack encryption, replay protection, or monitoring integration. Standardization reduces attack surface and simplifies validation. Controlled protocol selection strengthens supply chain and integration assurance.
|
| SPR-77 |
The [spacecraft] shall employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses processes which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with system functions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,AC-6,AC-6(9),CA-9,CM-5,CM-5(5),CM-5(6),SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(14),SA-8(23),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-7(29),SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3}
|
Least privilege limits damage from compromised processes or insider misuse. Processes receive only the minimum access necessary for assigned functions. This reduces lateral movement and privilege escalation pathways. In deterministic spacecraft systems, privilege boundaries must be tightly defined and enforced.
|
| SPR-78 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide independent mission/cyber critical threads such that any one credible event will not corrupt another mission/cyber critical thread.{SV-AC-6,SV-MA-3,SV-SP-7}{SC-3,SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3,SI-13}
|
Segregating mission-critical and cyber-critical execution paths prevents a single failure or compromise from corrupting other critical functions. Thread independence supports fault containment and resilience under attack. This ensures availability of essential functions even during partial compromise. Isolation strengthens both safety and cybersecurity.
|
| SPR-80 |
The [spacecraft] shall execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates uploaded are exactly as specified by the gold copies. {SV-SP-9,SV-IT-3,SV-SP-3}{CM-3(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(21),SA-8(31),SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(6),SI-7(10),SI-7(12)}
|
Ensuring updates match approved gold copies prevents insertion of malicious or altered firmware/software. Compromise during update processes is a high-impact attack vector. Validation protects the trusted computing baseline. This supports recovery and reconstitution integrity.
|
| SPR-81 |
The [spacecraft] shall perform an integrity check of software, firmware, and information at startup or during security- events.{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-3}{CM-3(5),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-7(1),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SI-7(17)}
|
Startup integrity checks detect boot-level compromise or unauthorized modification. Event-triggered checks provide additional protection when anomalies occur. This limits adversary persistence across reboots. Continuous validation reinforces trusted boot regimes.
|
| SPR-82 |
The [spacecraft] boot firmware shall validate the boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order, against their respective signatures.{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
A signature is ~770 bits long. No requirement is imposed on the storage location of signatures.
|
| SPR-83 |
The [spacecraft] boot firmware shall verify a trust chain that extends through the hardware root of trust, boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order.{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
These three items were chosen because they’re intended to be static values (once properly set up) but are in volatile storage. Also, the Boot ROM can’t be modified, so there’s no reason to check a signature.
|
| SPR-84 |
The [spacecraft] trusted boot/RoT computing module shall be implemented on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-5}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Root of Trust must be anchored in immutable hardware to prevent software-level compromise. Radiation-tolerant burn-in hardware ensures stability in space environments. Non-programmable components prevent adversarial modification of trust anchors. Hardware-based trust strengthens system-wide assurance.
|
| SPR-85 |
The [spacecraft] trusted boot/RoT shall be a separate compute engine controlling the trusted computing platform cryptographic processor.{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-7}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Separating the trust engine from general-purpose compute reduces attack surface. Independent control over cryptographic processors prevents compromised flight software from influencing trust validation. This architectural separation preserves chain-of-trust integrity. Isolation enhances resilience against firmware-level threats.
|
| SPR-86 |
The [spacecraft] shall perform attestation at each stage of startup and ensure overall trusted boot regime (i.e., root of trust).{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10),SI-7(17)}
|
It is important for the computing module to be able to access a set of functions and commands that it trusts; that is, that it knows to be true. This concept is referred to as root of trust (RoT) and should be included in the spacecraft design. With RoT, a device can always be trusted to operate as expected. RoT functions, such as verifying the device’s own code and configuration, must be implemented in secure hardware (i.e., field programmable gate arrays). By checking the security of each stage of power-up, RoT devices form the first link in a chain of trust that protects the spacecraft
|
| SPR-87 |
The [spacecraft] shall be configured to provide only essential capabilities.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-1}{CM-6,CM-7,SA-8(2),SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(23),SA-8(26),SA-15(5)}
|
Minimizing enabled functionality reduces attack surface and complexity. Unused services create unnecessary exposure. Essential-only configuration aligns with least functionality principles. This simplifies validation and reduces exploit vectors.
|
| SPR-88 |
The [spacecraft] shall detect and recover from detected memory errors or transitions to a known cyber-safe state.{SV-IT-4,SV-AV-6}{IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-10(6),SI-13,SI-17}
|
Memory corruption may result from radiation, fault injection, or malicious manipulation. Detection prevents silent data corruption from propagating to mission-critical functions. Recovery mechanisms or safe-state transitions preserve availability. Rapid containment supports mission survivability.
|
| SPR-90 |
The [organization] shall define and document the transitional state or security-relevant events when the spacecraft will perform integrity checks on software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{SA-8(21),SI-7(1),SI-7(10),SR-4(4)}
|
Integrity checks must be executed at well-defined lifecycle transitions (e.g., boot, mode change, update, anomaly). Clear documentation prevents gaps in validation coverage. Transitional state definitions ensure consistent enforcement across mission phases. This supports predictable and auditable trust verification.
|
| SPR-91 |
The [spacecraft] shall prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-3,CM-3(8),CM-5,CM-5(3),CM-14,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3,SI-7(12),SI-7(15)}
|
Requiring digital signature verification before installing flight software prevents unauthorized, malicious, or tampered code from being introduced into the spacecraft environment. Software supply chain compromise is a high-impact attack vector that can result in persistent control or loss of mission. Cryptographic validation ensures only approved and trusted binaries are executed. This maintains integrity of the trusted computing baseline.
|
| SPR-92 |
The [spacecraft] shall verify the correct operation of security- software and hardware mechanisms.{SV-DCO-1}{SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-6}
|
Security controls that fail silently create false confidence and blind spots. Continuous or periodic verification ensures cryptographic modules, access controls, logging mechanisms, and monitoring functions remain operational. Attackers often attempt to disable protections prior to executing malicious actions. Independent health checks preserve detection and enforcement reliability.
|
| SPR-93 |
The [spacecraft] shall require multi‑factor authorization for: (a) all spacecraft operating system and application updates; (b) updates to task‑scheduling functionality; and (c) creation or update of onboard stored command sequences.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{AC-3(2),CM-3(8),CM-5,IA-2,PM-12,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3(8),SI-7(12),SI-10(6)}
|
The intent is for multiple checks to be performed prior to executing these SV SW updates. One action is mere act of uploading the SW to the spacecraft. Another action could be check of digital signature (ideal but not explicitly required) or hash or CRC or a checksum. Crypto boxes provide another level of authentication for all commands, including SW updates but ideally there is another factor outside of crypto to protect against FSW updates. Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).
|
| SPR-94 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability for data connection ports or input/output devices to be disabled or removed prior to spacecraft operations.{SV-AC-5}{SA-9(2),SC-7(14),SC-41,SC-51}
|
Intent is for external physical data ports to be disabled (logical or physical) while in operational orbit. Port disablement does not necessarily need to be irreversible.
|
| SPR-95 |
The [spacecraft] shall enforce an attribute-based access control policy over subjects and objects as defined in AC-3(3).{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-4}{AC-3(13)}
|
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) enables dynamic, context-aware enforcement beyond static role assignments. This reduces privilege abuse and insider misuse by incorporating mission state, location, and environmental factors into decisions. ABAC supports least privilege while enabling operational flexibility. Proper enforcement limits lateral movement and unauthorized data access.
|
| SPR-96 |
The [spacecraft] shall uniquely identify and authenticate the ground station and other spacecraft before establishing a remote connection.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(10),AC-20,IA-3,IA-4,SA-8(18),SI-3(9)}
|
|
| SPR-97 |
All [spacecraft] commands which have unrecoverable consequence must have dual authentication prior to command execution. The [spacecraft] shall verify two independent cryptographic approvals prior to execution and shall generate an audit record binding both approver identifiers to the command identifier, time, and outcome.{SV-AC-4,SV-AC-8,SV-AC-2}{AU-9(5),IA-3,IA-4,IA-10,PE-3,PM-12,SA-8(15),SA-8(21),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-3(9),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-7(12),SI-10(6),SI-13}
|
Commands with irreversible impact require heightened assurance to prevent catastrophic mission loss. Dual independent cryptographic approvals mitigate insider threat, key compromise, and single-point credential abuse. Binding approver identifiers to the audit trail strengthens accountability and deterrence. This reduces the probability of unauthorized hazardous command execution.
|
| SPR-98 |
The [spacecraft] shall have a method to ensure the integrity of which have unrecoverable consequence and validate their authenticity before execution.{SV-AC-2,SV-IT-2,SV-IT-1}{AU-9(5),IA-3,IA-4,IA-10,PE-3,PM-12,SA-8(15),SA-8(21),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-3(9),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-7(12),SI-10(6),SI-13}
|
Hazardous commands must be cryptographically protected and validated prior to execution. Integrity and authenticity checks prevent replay, modification, or injection of destructive instructions. Without validation, RF interception or command path compromise could result in mission-ending actions. This ensures critical commands are both authorized and unaltered.
|
| SPR-99 |
The [spacecraft] shall recover from cyber-safe mode to mission operations within 20 minutes.{SV-MA-5}{CP-2(3),CP-2(5),IR-4,SA-8(24)}
|
Upon conclusion of addressing the threat, the system should be capable of recovering from the minimal survival mode back into a mission-ready state within defined timelines. The intent is to define the timelines and the capability to return back to mission operations.
|
| SPR-100 |
The [spacecraft] shall monitor [Program defined telemetry points] for malicious commanding attempts.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{SC-7,AU-3(1),AC-17(1)}
|
Source from AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2019-02178
Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) - Counts received valid commands
Rejected Command Counter - Counts received invalid commands
Command Receiver On/Off Mode - Indicates times command receiver is accepting commands
Command Receivers Received Signal Strength - Analog measure of the amount of received RF energy at the receive frequency
Command Receiver Lock Modes - Indicates when command receiver has achieved lock on command signal
Telemetry Downlink Modes - Indicates when the satellite’s telemetry was transmitting
Cryptographic Modes - Indicates the operating modes of the various encrypted links
Received Commands - Log of all commands received and executed by the satellite
System Clock - Master onboard clock
GPS Ephemeris - Indicates satellite location derived from GPS Signals
|
| SPR-101 |
The [spacecraft] shall require multi-factor authorization for all updates to the task scheduling functionality within the spacecraft.{SV-AV-4}{AC-3(2)}
|
Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).
|
| SPR-102 |
The [spacecraft] shall require multi-factor authorization for new and updates to on-board stored command sequences.{SV-IT-5}{AC-3(2)}
|
Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).
|
| SPR-103 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide non-identical methods, or functionally independent methods, for commanding a mission critical function when the software is the sole control of that function.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{AC-3(2)}
|
When software is sole controller of a critical function, redundant and functionally independent command paths reduce systemic risk. A single vulnerability should not allow full compromise of a hazardous control. Diverse mechanisms increase resilience against common-mode failures. This supports both safety and cybersecurity assurance.
|
| SPR-104 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide two independent and unique command messages to deactivate a fault tolerant capability for a critical or catastrophic hazard.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{AC-3(2)}
|
Disabling fault tolerance creates a high-risk operational state. Requiring two independent and unique commands reduces likelihood of accidental or malicious deactivation. This prevents a single compromised control path from undermining redundancy. Hazard mitigation systems must not be easily bypassed.
|
| SPR-105 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide two independent and unique command messages to deactivate a fault tolerant capability for a critical or catastrophic hazard.{AC-3(2),PE-10,SA-8(15)}
|
|
| SPR-106 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide non-identical methods, or functionally independent methods, for commanding a mission critical function when the software is the sole control of that function.{AC-3(2),SI-3(8),SI-13}
|
|
| SPR-107 |
The [spacecraft] shall have multiple uplink paths {SV-AV-1}{CP-8,CP-11,SA-8(18),SC-5,SC-47}
|
Redundant uplink paths preserve command capability during jamming, interference, or subsystem failure. Availability is a core mission assurance objective. Diverse communication channels reduce single-point failure risk. This enhances resiliency in contested RF environments.
|
| SPR-113 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement protections against external and internal communications from jamming attempts; verification for anti‑jam shall be distinct from EMI/EPM, EMP/HANE hardness, and anti‑spoof protections.{SV-AV-1}{SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}
|
Jamming disrupts availability and can mask other malicious activities. Dedicated anti-jam mechanisms preserve command and telemetry continuity. Distinguishing from EMI/EPM and anti-spoof ensures comprehensive RF threat coverage. Availability protections must be validated independently.
|
| SPR-114 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect external and internal communications from jamming and spoofing attempts; verification for anti‑spoof shall be distinct from EMI/EPM and EMP/HANE hardness.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}
|
Can be aided via the Crosslink, S-Band, and L-Band subsystems
|
| SPR-117 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations.{SV-AC-1}{AC-2(11),IA-10,SI-4(13),SI-4(25)}
|
This could be performed using command lockout based upon when the spacecraft is over selected regions. This should be configurable so that when conflicts arise, the Program can update. The goal is so the spacecraft won't accept a command when the spacecraft determines it is in a certain region.
|
| SPR-122 |
The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys using NSA Certified or Approved key management technology and processes per CNSSP 12. Private cryptographic keys shall be generated, stored, and rotated under [organization] control only and shall not be exposed to external service providers.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-9(6),SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2),SC-12(3)}
|
Centralized and approved key management prevents unauthorized key generation or rotation. Protecting private keys from external service providers reduces supply chain risk. Controlled lifecycle management supports confidentiality and integrity. Strong governance reduces key compromise likelihood.
|
| SPR-126 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the [all information] using cryptography while it is at rest.{SV-IT-2,SV-CF-2}{SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)}
|
* Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. This is often referred to as data-at-rest encryption.
|
| SPR-128 |
The [spacecraft] shall accept hazardous commands only when prerequisite checks are satisfied.{SV-AC-8,SV-AV-5}{AC-17(4),SI-10,SI-10(6)}
|
Precondition validation ensures hazardous commands are executed only under safe system states. This prevents execution under anomalous or compromised conditions. Independent verification reduces false activation risk. Safety and cyber controls must be integrated.
|
| SPR-129 |
The [spacecraft] shall restrict the use of information inputs to spacecraft and designated ground stations as defined in the applicable ICDs.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-20,SC-23,SI-10,SI-10(5),SI-10(6)}
|
Limiting inputs to approved spacecraft and ground stations reduces spoofing and injection risk. ICD-defined boundaries prevent rogue sources from influencing control systems. This constrains trust relationships. Controlled input surfaces reduce attack vectors.
|
| SPR-130 |
The [spacecraft] shall discriminate between valid and invalid input into the software and rejects invalid input.{SV-SP-1,SV-IT-2}{SC-16(2),SI-3(8),SI-10,SI-10(3),SI-10(6)}
|
Input validation prevents buffer overflows, injection, and parser exploitation. Rejecting malformed or unexpected data reduces denial-of-service and corruption risks. Deterministic validation improves resilience. Robust input handling is fundamental to secure software.
|
| SPR-131 |
The [spacecraft] shall identify and reject commands received out-of-sequence when the out-of-sequence commands can cause a hazard/failure or degrade the control of a hazard or mission.{SV-AC-2,SV-AV-4}{SC-16(2),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-10,SI-10(6),SI-13}
|
Command sequencing enforces operational logic and safety interlocks. Out-of-sequence commands may bypass safeguards. Sequence enforcement prevents replay and control manipulation. This preserves control flow integrity.
|
| SPR-140 |
The [spacecraft] shall properly handle spurious input and missing data.{SV-SP-1,SV-AV-6}{SI-10,SI-10(3),SI-10(6)}
|
Spurious or missing data may indicate attack or fault conditions. Robust handling prevents cascading failures. Defensive programming ensures safe defaults and fallback states. This reduces exploitability of abnormal input conditions.
|
| SPR-141 |
The [spacecraft] shall perform prerequisite checks for the execution of hazardous commands.{SI-10,SI-10(6),SI-13}
|
|
| SPR-142 |
The [spacecraft] shall only use or include critical commands for the purpose of providing emergency access where commanding authority is appropriately restricted.{SI-3(8),SI-10,SI-10(3)}
|
|
| SPR-144 |
The [spacecraft] shall validate a functionally independent parameter prior to the issuance of any sequence that could remove an inhibit, or perform a hazardous action.{SV-AC-8,SV-MA-3}{SI-10(3),SI-10(6),SI-13}
|
Redundant validation mechanisms ensure hazardous transitions cannot occur through single-point compromise. Independent parameters strengthen control integrity. This reduces exploit paths for inhibit removal. Critical operations demand dual validation logic.
|
| SPR-149 |
The [spacecraft] shall perform an integrity check of [Program-defined software, firmware, configuration parameters, and tables] at startup; at [Program-defined transitional states or security-relevant events] and shall verify integrity on receipt and prior to activation of any uploaded package.{SV-IT-2}{SI-7(1)}
|
Transitional states often introduce vulnerability windows. Integrity checks at these moments detect tampering before activation. Pre-activation validation prevents malicious update deployment. This reinforces chain-of-trust enforcement.
|
| SPR-151 |
The [spacecraft] shall automatically [Selection (one or more):restarts the FSW/processor, performs side swap, audits failure; implements Program-defined security safeguards] when integrity violations are discovered.{SV-IT-2}{SI-7(8)}
|
Immediate system response prevents continued exploitation after detection. Restart, side swap, or safeguard activation restores known-good state. Automated actions reduce dwell time. Rapid containment is essential in communication-limited environments.
|
| SPR-152 |
The [spacecraft] shall use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the [spacecraft] is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available.{SV-SP-3}{CM-2(2),CM-3(5),CM-3(7),CM-6,SA-8(8)}
|
This could be command trigger from Ground or elsewhere. The point here is that the self-test is executed onboard the spacecraft via onboard HW/SW self-test mechanisms and its result is reported to the Ground
|
| SPR-153 |
The [spacecraft] operating system, if COTS or FOSS, shall be selected from a [organization]-defined acceptance list.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(8),CM-7(5)}
|
Selecting OS from approved list reduces exposure to unvetted vulnerabilities. Controlled selection supports maintainability and patch governance. This mitigates risk from insecure or unsupported platforms. Trusted baselines simplify compliance verification.
|
| SPR-154 |
The [spacecraft] shall be capable of removing flight software after updated versions have been installed.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-8(8),SI-2(6)}
|
Removing outdated software prevents reactivation of vulnerable versions. This reduces persistence opportunities for adversaries. Maintaining minimal installed versions reduces attack surface. Clean update lifecycle supports system hygiene.
|
| SPR-155 |
The [organization] shall ensure that software planned for reuse meets the fit, form, and function, and security as a component within the new application.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(5)}
|
Reused components may introduce hidden vulnerabilities. Validation ensures compatibility and security alignment with new mission context. Prior approval does not guarantee safe reuse. Rigorous assessment prevents latent risk inheritance.
|
| SPR-156 |
The [spacecraft] shall enforce access restrictions associated with changes to the spacecraft.{SV-SP-9,SV-AC-4}{CM-5}
|
Configuration changes may introduce vulnerabilities. Restricting and auditing change access preserves baseline integrity. Controlled modification reduces insider threat. Change governance supports mission assurance.
|
| SPR-166 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to modify the set of audited events (e.g., cyber-relevant data).{SV-DCO-1}{AU-12(3),AU-14}
|
Flexibility allows adaptation to evolving threats. Adjustable audit scope ensures relevant telemetry is captured. This supports threat-driven monitoring strategies. Controlled modification preserves operational balance.
|
| SPR-167 |
The [spacecraft] shall be configured to allocate audit record storage capacity in accordance with 1 week audit record storage requirements.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-4,AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2)}
|
Defined storage capacity prevents premature log overwriting. Retention ensures forensic reconstruction capability. Adequate capacity supports delayed downlink scenarios. Storage planning enhances accountability.
|
| SPR-168 |
The [spacecraft] shall downlink relevant audit log data to ground systems frequently enough to avoid any situation where audit storage capacity is exceeded.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-4(1)}
|
The frequency of offloading this data depends on the amount of data being audited/logged and will vary across missions/systems.
|
| SPR-169 |
The [spacecraft] shall attribute cyberattacks and identify unauthorized use of the spacecraft by downlinking onboard cyber information to the mission ground station within [mission-appropriate timelines minutes].{SV-DCO-1}{AU-4(1),SI-4(5)}
|
Requirement is to support offboard attribution by enabling the fusion of spacecraft cyber data with ground-based cyber data. This would provide end-to-end accountability of commands, data, and other data that can be used to determine the origin of attack from the ground system. Data should be provided within time constraints relevant for the particular mission and its given operational mode. Analysis should be performed to identify the specific timeliness requirements for a mission, which may vary depending on mission mode, operational status, availability of communications resources, and other factors. The specific data required should be identified, as well.
|
| SPR-170 |
The [spacecraft] shall alert in the event of the [organization]-defined audit/logging processing failures.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5}
|
Audit failure may indicate tampering or resource exhaustion. Immediate alert prevents silent loss of visibility. Detection continuity is essential for defense. Monitoring integrity must be assured.
|
| SPR-172 |
The [organization] shall integrate terrestrial system audit log analysis as part of the standard anomaly resolution process to correlate any anomalous behavior in the terrestrial systems that correspond to anomalous behavior in the spacecraft.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(1),IR-5(1)}
|
Correlation across ground and space segments improves attribution accuracy. End-to-end visibility detects pivoting attacks. Integration strengthens anomaly resolution. Enterprise/Whole mission fusion enhances threat awareness.
|
| SPR-173 |
The [spacecraft] shall record time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).{SV-DCO-1}{AU-8}
|
Standardized time enables cross-system correlation. Accurate timestamps are critical for forensic analysis. UTC/GMT alignment ensures interoperability. Consistent timekeeping supports coordinated response.
|
| SPR-174 |
The [spacecraft] shall record time stamps for audit records that provide a granularity of one Z-count (1.5 sec).{SV-DCO-1}{AU-8}
|
Fine granularity improves event reconstruction accuracy. Short time resolution enables sequencing analysis. Precise timestamps strengthen evidentiary value. Temporal precision aids detection logic.
|
| SPR-175 |
The [spacecraft] shall use internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-8}
|
Using internal trusted clocks prevents manipulation via external time signals. Independent time generation strengthens integrity. This reduces risk of adversary-induced timeline distortion. Trusted time underpins reliable auditing.
|
| SPR-181 |
The [spacecraft] shall employ advanced analytics capabilities within the IDS/IPS to address dynamic never-before-seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies along with signature-based attacks. Models shall be trained and tuned using mission telemetry profiles to support predictive detection.{SV-DCO-1,SV-SP-1,SV-IT-2}{RA-3(4)}
|
Signature-based detection addresses known threats, while adaptive analytics detect novel or evolving behaviors. Spacecraft telemetry provides rich baseline data for predictive anomaly detection. Machine learning enhances early detection of zero-day or previously unseen tactics. Combining both approaches strengthens defense against advanced adversaries.
|
| SPR-195 |
The [spacecraft] shall audit the communications characteristics (signals, frequencies, etc.) associated with denied communications.{SV-IT-1,SV-AV-1,SV-DCO-1}{SC-7(9)}
|
Recording denied communications supports detection of probing and reconnaissance. Signal analysis may reveal adversary tactics or spoofing attempts. Visibility strengthens attribution and tuning of defenses. Denied attempts provide intelligence value.
|
| SPR-196 |
The [spacecraft] fault management solution shall utilize memory uncorrectable bit error detection information in a strategy to autonomously minimize the adverse effects of uncorrectable bit errors within the spacecraft.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
|
Radiation-induced errors may mimic malicious tampering. Integrating memory fault data into autonomous mitigation reduces impact. Rapid isolation prevents corrupted logic propagation. Cyber and radiation resilience must be coordinated.
|
| SPR-197 |
The [spacecraft] Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) shall have the ability to simultaneously update check-bits for [organization]-defined memory addresses.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
|
Real-time integrity updates ensure memory protection during high-speed operations. ISR-based validation minimizes exposure windows. Immediate correction enhances reliability. Hardware-software coordination improves robustness.
|
| SPR-198 |
The [spacecraft] shall integrate EDAC scheme with fault management and cyber-protection mechanisms to respond to the detection of uncorrectable multi-bit errors, other than time-delayed monitoring of EDAC telemetry by the mission operators on the ground.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
|
Uncorrectable errors may indicate attack or environmental damage. Automated response prevents reliance on delayed ground analysis. Integrated protection accelerates containment. Cybersecurity must leverage hardware integrity signals.
|
| SPR-199 |
The [spacecraft] shall use Error Detection and Correcting (EDAC) memory.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
|
Error detection and correction protects against radiation-induced corruption. Single-bit correction prevents latent system faults. Memory integrity is foundational to secure execution. Hardware reliability directly supports cybersecurity.
|
| SPR-200 |
The [spacecraft] shall utilize an EDAC scheme to routinely check for bit errors in the stored data on board the spacecraft, correct the single-bit errors, and identify the memory addresses of data with uncorrectable multi-bit errors of at least order two, if not higher order in some cases.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
|
Periodic checks detect accumulating degradation. Identifying affected addresses allows isolation of corrupted regions. Early detection prevents escalation into systemic failure. This supports predictive maintenance and anomaly detection.
|
| SPR-201 |
The [spacecraft] shall monitor all inbound/outbound communications to detect unusual or unauthorized behavior and respond appropriately (disregard command, deny connection, etc.){SV-IT-1,SV-AC-2,SV-IT-2,SV-CF-1}{SI-4(4)}
|
Continuous traffic inspection detects unauthorized behavior. Both inbound and outbound flows may signal compromise. Real-time response reduces dwell time. Visibility across communication paths is essential in contested environments.
|
| SPR-202 |
The [organization] shall define the security safeguards to be employed to protect the availability of system resources.{SV-AC-6}{SC-6,SI-17}
|
Explicit availability planning ensures defensive resources are provisioned. Clear safeguards prevent ad hoc reactions during incidents. Structured resilience planning supports mission assurance. Availability is often a primary operational objective.
|
| SPR-203 |
The [spacecraft] shall have failure tolerance on sensors used by software to make mission-critical decisions.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-13,SI-17}
|
Sensor compromise or failure must not directly lead to hazardous action. Redundancy and validation ensure trustworthy inputs. Independent verification reduces risk of manipulation. Critical decisions require reliable sensing.
|
| SPR-204 |
The [spacecraft] cyber-safe mode software/configuration shall be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and shall not be modifiable.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Cyber-safe mode is using a fail-secure mentality where if there is a malfunction that the spacecraft goes into a fail-secure state where cyber protections like authentication and encryption are still employed (instead of bypassed) and the spacecraft can be restored by authorized commands. The cyber-safe mode should be stored in a high integrity location of the on-board SV so that it cannot be modified by attackers.
|
| SPR-205 |
The [spacecraft] shall safely transition between all predefined, known states.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-3,SV-AV-6}{SI-17}
|
Deterministic transitions prevent undefined or unstable states. Controlled state management limits exploitation windows. Safety logic must anticipate abnormal conditions. Predictable behavior enhances resilience.
|
| SPR-206 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall detect and recover/transition from detected memory errors to a known cyber-safe state.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Memory corruption can degrade or hijack execution. Automated detection and transition to safe state prevents escalation. Recovery mechanisms reduce persistent compromise risk. Resilience requires automatic containment.
|
| SPR-207 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall initialize the spacecraft to a known safe state.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Startup is a vulnerable period for tampering. Initialization ensures clean baseline before operations begin. Safe defaults prevent unauthorized persistence. Boot integrity establishes trust.
|
| SPR-208 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall operate securely in off-nominal power conditions, including loss of power and spurious power transients.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Power instability may disrupt security controls. Robust design prevents exploit via induced power anomalies. Controlled behavior during transients preserves integrity. Cyber resilience must consider physical fault conditions.
|
| SPR-209 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall perform an orderly, controlled system shutdown to a known cyber-safe state upon receipt of a termination command or condition.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Graceful shutdown prevents data corruption and incomplete processes. Controlled transitions reduce recovery complexity. Secure shutdown blocks adversary exploitation during failure states. Predictable termination supports resilience.
|
| SPR-210 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall recover to a known cyber-safe state when an anomaly is detected.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Anomaly-triggered containment reduces attacker dwell time. Safe fallback states preserve mission viability. Autonomous response is essential given communication latency. Rapid isolation prevents lateral spread.
|
| SPR-211 |
The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall safely transition between all predefined, known states.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}
|
Safe and deterministic state transitions prevent undefined behavior that could be exploited during abnormal or adversarial conditions. Many cyber and fault-based attacks attempt to force systems into unexpected transitional states where validation checks may be bypassed. By ensuring transitions only occur along predefined, verified paths, the spacecraft reduces opportunities for logic corruption or hazardous command execution. Controlled state management strengthens both safety assurance and cybersecurity resilience.
|
| SPR-213 |
The [spacecraft] boot firmware shall enter a recovery routine upon failing to verify signed data in the trust chain, and not execute or trust that signed data.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
No other requirements are imposed on the recovery routine besides not using the failed data. Unverifiable data isn’t trusted and shouldn’t be run.
|
| SPR-214 |
The [spacecraft] root of trust shall be an ECDSA NIST P-384 public key.{SV-AC-3,SV-IT-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Strong elliptic curve cryptography ensures robust digital signature validation. P-384 provides long-term cryptographic assurance. Root of trust underpins secure boot and update integrity. High-strength algorithms mitigate future cryptanalytic advances.
|
| SPR-215 |
The [spacecraft] root of trust shall be loadable only once, post-purchase.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Preventing post-deployment modification protects foundational trust anchors. Immutable RoT blocks adversary replacement of cryptographic keys. Hardware-level assurance strengthens supply chain defense. Trust must not be alterable in orbit.
|
| SPR-216 |
The [spacecraft] secure boot mechanism shall be Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA) compliant.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
No certification process is required (or exists). The CNSA is easy to meet, only restricts algorithm choice, and aids ease-of-use for government customers.
|
| SPR-217 |
The [spacecraft] shall allocate enough boot ROM memory for secure boot firmware execution.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Secure boot requires protected execution space. Sufficient ROM ensures immutable verification routines. Resource planning prevents insecure fallback mechanisms. Boot memory is critical to chain-of-trust integrity.
|
| SPR-218 |
The [spacecraft] shall allocate enough SRAM memory for secure boot firmware execution.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Volatile secure execution space prevents tampering persistence. SRAM allocation supports cryptographic operations. Adequate memory prevents degraded security routines. Secure boot must not be resource constrained.
|
| SPR-219 |
The [spacecraft] shall support the algorithmic construct of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) NIST P-384 + SHA-38 or equivalent strength.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)}
|
Timing data may suggest cryptographic accelerators are unnecessary. This construct was chosen because (a) it’s in the CNSA suite and (b) it doesn’t require secret values to be stored
|
| SPR-220 |
The [spacecraft] hardware root of trust shall be an ECDSA NIST P-384 public key.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)}
|
No requirement is imposed on uniqueness.
|
| SPR-221 |
The [spacecraft] hardware root of trust shall be loadable only once, post-purchase.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)}
|
No requirement is imposed on preventing hardware readout. The public key belongs to the customer, not the manufacturer, so it must be loaded after purchase. Also, if it can be overwritten, there’s no reason to trust it.
|
| SPR-222 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement trusted boot/RoT as a separate compute engine controlling the trusted computing platform cryptographic processor.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)}
|
Isolation of RoT prevents compromise via main processor exploitation. Dedicated engine strengthens integrity of signature validation. Separation reduces attack surface. Hardware trust boundaries enhance assurance.
|
| SPR-223 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement trusted boot/RoT computing module on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)}
|
Space radiation may corrupt trust logic. Radiation-hardened modules ensure continued secure boot enforcement. Environmental resilience preserves cryptographic integrity. Hardware trust must survive mission conditions.
|
| SPR-227 |
The [organization] shall identify all locations (including ground and contractor systems) that store or process sensitive system information.{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10}{AC-3(11),CM-12}
|
Space system sensitive information can include a wide range of candidate material: functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of link segment protections subject to disabling/bypassing, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and mission operations.
|
| SPR-228 |
The [organization] shall identify sensitive mission data (e.g.CPI) and document the specific on-board components on which the information is processed and stored.{SV-MA-4,SV-CF-3}{AC-3(11),CM-12}
|
Space system sensitive information can include a wide range of candidate material: functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of link segment protections subject to disabling/bypassing, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and mission operations.
|
| SPR-229 |
The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}
|
Documentation may reveal architecture details exploitable by adversaries. Proper handling prevents leakage. Protection of CUI supports regulatory compliance. Information governance complements technical controls.
|
| SPR-230 |
The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}
|
* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
|
| SPR-231 |
The [organization] shall distribute documentation to only personnel with defined roles and a need to know.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{CM-12,CP-2,SA-5,SA-10}
|
Least privilege and need to know should be employed with the protection of all documentation. Documentation can contain sensitive information that can aid in vulnerability discovery, detection, and exploitation. For example, command dictionaries for ground and space systems should be handles with extreme care. Additionally, design documents for missions contain many key elements that if compromised could aid in an attacker successfully exploiting the system.
|
| SPR-232 |
The [organization] shall conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions and critical components and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-MA-4}{CP-2,CP-2(8),PL-7,PM-11,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),RA-9,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(25),SA-12,SA-14,SA-15(3),SC-7(29),SR-1}
|
During SCRM, criticality analysis will aid in determining supply chain risk. For mission critical functions/components, extra scrutiny must be applied to ensure supply chain is secured.
|
| SPR-233 |
The [organization] shall identify the applicable physical and environmental protection policies covering the development environment and spacecraft hardware. {SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-10}{PE-1,PE-14,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-10(3)}
|
Development environments must be protected from tampering. Physical controls prevent hardware supply chain compromise. Policy clarity ensures consistent safeguards. Secure development underpins secure deployment.
|
| SPR-234 |
The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific identification and authentication policies for accessing the development environment and spacecraft. {SV-SP-10,SV-AC-4}{AC-3,AC-14,IA-1,SA-3,SA-3(1)}
|
Strong authentication prevents unauthorized development access. Development compromise can introduce malicious code. Documented policies ensure consistent enforcement. Identity governance supports supply chain integrity.
|
| SPR-235 |
The [organization] shall ensure security requirements/configurations are placed in accordance with NIST 800-171 with enhancements in 800-172 on the development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10,SV-CF-3}{AC-3,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-15}
|
Supply chain threats target development environments. Enhanced controls reduce risk of source code exfiltration. Compliance strengthens contractual and regulatory assurance. Development security directly impacts spacecraft integrity.
|
| SPR-236 |
The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
|
The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
|
| SPR-237 |
The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{SV-SP-2,SV-SP-1}{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)}
|
Abuse-case testing reveals design weaknesses before deployment. Red-teaming strengthens defensive posture. Proactive validation reduces operational risk. Testing must simulate realistic threat scenarios.
|
| SPR-238 |
The [organization] shall require subcontractors developing information system components or providing information system services (as appropriate) to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}
|
Select the particular subcontractors, software vendors, and manufacturers based on the criticality analysis performed for the Program Protection Plan and the criticality of the components that they supply. Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
|
| SPR-239 |
The [organization] shall approve, document, and control the use of operational data in preproduction environments (i.e., development, I&T, etc.).{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-10}{SA-3(2)}
|
Operational data in test environments increases exposure risk. Controlled handling prevents unintended leakage. Proper governance reduces insider and supply chain risk. Sensitive data must be protected at all lifecycle stages.
|
| SPR-240 |
The [organization] shall categorize/classify preproduction environments (i.e., development, I&T, etc.) at the same level as any operational data in use within the environment and protect the system consistent with its categorization/classification.{SV-SP-10,SV-SP-4}{SA-3(2)}
|
Development systems often become attack vectors. Equal classification ensures consistent safeguards. Protection must reflect data sensitivity. Weak dev security undermines operational integrity.
|
| SPR-241 |
The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to identify organizational data that will be processed or stored on non-organizational systems.{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-6}{SA-4(12)}
|
Awareness of data location prevents uncontrolled exposure. Third-party systems may lack equivalent security. Explicit identification enables mitigation. Data governance strengthens risk management.
|
| SPR-242 |
The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to remove all organizational data from contractor system(s) when no longer needed for development purposes or whenever instructed by the organization.{SV-CF-3}{SA-4(12),SI-21}
|
Residual data increases breach impact. Timely removal reduces exposure. Lifecycle data hygiene is critical. Controlled offboarding prevents persistence of sensitive information.
|
| SPR-243 |
The [organization] shall protect documentation and Essential Elements of Information (EEI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{SA-5}
|
Essential Elements of Information (EEI):
|
| SPR-244 |
The [organization] shall define the secure communication protocols to be used within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1}{PL-7,RA-5(4),SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3),SC-40(4),SI-12}
|
Standardized secure protocols reduce interoperability risk. Alignment with federal standards ensures validated cryptography. Defined protocols prevent ad hoc insecure implementations. Governance strengthens communication assurance.
|
| SPR-245 |
The [organization] shall define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification tools detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-6,CP-2,IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SC-16(1),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(7),SI-7(10)}
|
Predefined response procedures reduce reaction time. Clear escalation paths improve containment. Consistent handling prevents confusion during incidents. Preparedness strengthens resilience.
|
| SPR-246 |
The [organization] shall ensure that all Electrical, Electronic, Electro-mechanical & Electro-optical (EEEE) and mechanical piece parts procured from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) or their authorized distribution network.{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SC-16(1),SR-1,SR-5}
|
|
| SPR-248 |
The [organization] shall employ Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services. {CP-2(8),PM-30,SA-12(9),SC-38,SR-7}
|
Supply chain information can reveal vulnerabilities. OPSEC reduces adversary intelligence gathering. Controlled disclosure minimizes targeting risk. Information discipline strengthens strategic defense.
|
| SPR-249 |
The [organization] shall employ [Program-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards] to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CP-2(8),PM-30,SA-12(9),SC-38,SR-7}
|
OPSEC safeguards may include: (1) Limiting the disclosure of information needed to design, develop, test, produce, deliver, and support the element for example, supplier identities, supplier processes, potential suppliers, security requirements, design specifications, testing and evaluation result, and system/component configurations, including the use of direct shipping, blind buys, etc.; (2) Extending supply chain awareness, education, and training for suppliers, intermediate users, and end users; (3) Extending the range of OPSEC tactics, techniques, and procedures to potential suppliers, contracted suppliers, or sub-prime contractor tier of suppliers; and (4) Using centralized support and maintenance services to minimize direct interactions between end users and original suppliers.
|
| SPR-250 |
The [organization] shall verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls (to include abuse cases and penetration testing) at the depth of testing defined in the test documents.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,RA-5(3),SA-11(5),SA-11(7)}
|
* The frequency of testing should be driven by Program completion events and updates.
* Examples of approaches are static analyses, dynamic analyses, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches
|
| SPR-251 |
The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11}
|
Documented evidence provides traceability and accountability for security testing activities. Without retained artifacts, organizations cannot demonstrate due diligence or validate corrective actions. Preserved results support audits, mission reviews, and lessons learned. This strengthens governance and compliance posture.
|
| SPR-252 |
The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)}
|
The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls.
|
| SPR-253 |
The [organization] shall coordinate penetration testing on mission critical spacecraft components (hardware and/or software).{SV-MA-4}{CA-8,CA-8(1),CP-4(5)}
|
Not all defects (i.e., buffer overflows, race conditions, and memory leaks) can be discovered statically and require execution of the system. This is where space-centric cyber testbeds (i.e., cyber ranges) are imperative as they provide an environment to maliciously attack components in a controlled environment to discover these undesirable conditions. Technology has improved to where digital twins for spacecraft are achievable, which provides an avenue for cyber testing that was often not performed due to perceived risk to the flight hardware.
|
| SPR-254 |
The [organization] shall employ dynamic analysis (e.g.using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-8,CM-10(1),RA-3(1),SA-11(5),SA-11(8),SA-11(9),SI-3,SI-7(10)}
|
Dynamic testing uncovers runtime vulnerabilities not visible through static review. Techniques such as fuzzing and penetration testing simulate realistic adversarial behavior. Runtime validation improves detection of memory corruption, logic flaws, and unsafe state transitions. This reduces latent vulnerabilities prior to deployment.
|
| SPR-255 |
The [organization] shall employ independent third-party analysis and penetration testing of all software (COTS, FOSS, Custom) associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6}{CA-2,CA-2(1),CA-8(1),CM-10(1),SA-9,SA-11(3),SA-12(11),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4),SR-6(1)}
|
Independent assessment reduces bias and uncovers blind spots in internal reviews. External testers provide objective validation of system resilience. Independent penetration testing strengthens confidence in defensive posture. Separation of duties enhances credibility and assurance.
|
| SPR-256 |
The [organization] shall perform penetration testing/analysis: (1) On potential system elements before accepting the system; (2) As a realistic simulation of the active adversary’s known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) Throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CA-8(1),SA-9,SA-11(5),SR-5(2)}
|
Penetration testing should be performed throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes including: (1) Hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (2) Shipping/handling procedures; (3) Personnel and physical security programs; (4) Configuration management tools/measures to maintain provenance; and (5) Any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production/distribution of supply chain elements.
|
| SPR-257 |
The [organization] shall analyze changes to the spacecraft to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.{SV-MA-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-4,CM-3,CM-3(2),CM-3(7),CM-4(2),SA-10}
|
Changes to spacecraft configuration may introduce unintended vulnerabilities. Pre-implementation impact analysis prevents security regression. Structured review ensures modifications align with risk tolerance. Change control supports mission assurance.
|
| SPR-259 |
The [organization] shall develop an incident response and forensics plan that covers the spacecrafts.{SV-MA-5}{CP-2,IR-1,IR-3,IR-3(2),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),IR-8,SA-15(10),SI-4(24)}
|
A structured response plan enables coordinated containment and recovery. Forensics planning ensures evidence preservation. Defined procedures reduce confusion during crisis. Incident readiness enhances resilience.
|
| SPR-262 |
The [organization] includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.{SV-AC-4}{AT-2(2),IR-4(6),IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-16}
|
Authorized users present significant risk vectors. Awareness training improves detection of anomalous behavior. Early reporting reduces insider dwell time. Human vigilance complements technical controls.
|
| SPR-263 |
The [organization] shall provide training to its personnel on how to identify and respond to malicious code indicators to include but not limited to indicators of potentially malicious code in flight software, indicators from development machine’s anti-virus/anti-malware software of potential malicious code, and to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in [organization] information systems.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-10}{AT-3(4),IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-4(24)}
|
Personnel must recognize signs of compromised flight or development systems. Early detection prevents propagation into mission assets. Training strengthens defense across lifecycle stages. Awareness reduces supply chain exposure.
|
| SPR-264 |
The [organization] shall report counterfeit information system components to [organization] officials. {SV-SP-4}{IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SA-19,SR-11}
|
Counterfeit components may contain malicious implants or reliability risks. Reporting ensures centralized tracking and mitigation. Early notification prevents systemic exposure. Hardware integrity underpins mission assurance.
|
| SPR-265 |
The [organization] shall report identified systems or system components containing software affected by recently announced cybersecurity-related software flaws (and potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws) to [organization] officials with cybersecurity responsibilities.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-2,SI-3,SI-4(12),SR-4(4)}
|
Rapid reporting of vulnerable components enables proactive remediation. Awareness of newly disclosed flaws prevents exploitation. Coordination ensures mission-wide response. Visibility reduces systemic risk.
|
| SPR-266 |
The [organization] shall determine the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that require remediation, and coordinate the timeline for that remediation, in accordance with the analysis of the vulnerability scan report, the mission assessment of risk, and mission needs.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-5,CM-3,RA-5,RA-7,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
|
Not all vulnerabilities carry equal mission impact. Risk-informed prioritization ensures critical flaws are addressed first. Coordinated timelines balance mission needs with security posture. Structured remediation strengthens governance.
|
| SPR-267 |
The [organization] shall perform software component analysis (a.k.a.origin analysis) for developed or acquired software.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-6}{CM-10,CM-10(1),RA-3(1),RA-5,SA-15(7),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4)}
|
Origin analysis identifies embedded third-party libraries and dependencies. Transparency reduces supply chain opacity. Knowing component lineage enables targeted vulnerability tracking. This mitigates inherited risk.
|
| SPR-268 |
The [organization] shall share information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with [Program-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).{SV-SP-1}{RA-5}
|
Sharing scan results prevents repeated weaknesses across systems. Enterprise/Mission visibility reduces systemic vulnerabilities. Collaborative learning enhances resilience. Cross-program transparency strengthens collective defense.
|
| SPR-269 |
The [organization] shall ensure that the vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., static analysis and/or component analysis tools) used include the capability to readily update the list of potential information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(3),SI-3}
|
Threat landscapes evolve rapidly. Regular tool updates ensure detection coverage remains current. Outdated signatures create blind spots. Continuous improvement sustains effectiveness.
|
| SPR-270 |
The [organization] shall perform vulnerability analysis and risk assessment of all systems and software. The analysis shall include results from hardware‑in‑the‑loop vulnerability scanning of flight software, firmware, and link‑segment interfaces.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SA-15(7),SI-3}
|
Integrated hardware-in-the-loop testing identifies operationally relevant weaknesses. Combined software, firmware, and interface scanning provides holistic coverage. Risk assessment ensures mitigation aligns with mission priorities. End-to-end analysis strengthens assurance.
|
| SPR-271 |
The [organization] shall ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact. Scanning shall cover flight software, firmware, and link‑segment interfaces in hardware‑in‑the‑loop environments.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SI-3}
|
Component/Origin scanning looks for open-source libraries/software that may be included into the baseline and looks for known vulnerabilities and open-source license violations.
|
| SPR-272 |
The [organization] shall perform static binary analysis of all firmware that is utilized on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-7(10)}
|
Many commercial products/parts are utilized within the system and should be analyzed for security weaknesses. Blindly accepting the firmware is free of weakness is unacceptable for high assurance missions. The intent is to not blindly accept firmware from unknown sources and assume it is secure. This is meant to apply to firmware the vendors are not developing internally. In-house developed firmware should be going through the vendor's own testing program and have high assurance it is secure. When utilizing firmware from other sources, "expecting" does not meet this requirement. Each supplier needs to provide evidence to support that claim that their firmware they are getting is genuine and secure.
|
| SPR-273 |
The [organization] shall perform static source code analysis for all available source code looking for [[organization]-defined Top CWE List] weaknesses using complimentary set of static code analysis tools (i.e.more than one).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-11(1),SA-15(7)}
|
Static analysis detects coding weaknesses before execution. Using multiple tools increases detection coverage. Alignment with defined CWE priorities ensures focus on high-risk flaws. Early detection reduces downstream remediation cost.
|
| SPR-274 |
The [organization] shall analyze vulnerability/weakness scan reports and results from security control assessments.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SI-3}
|
Scan results require expert interpretation to avoid false positives or overlooked risks. Structured analysis ensures meaningful remediation. Correlating findings with mission context refines prioritization. Review strengthens governance.
|
| SPR-275 |
The [organization] shall have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15,SA-15(7),RA-5}
|
Manual review cannot scale across the code base; you must have a way to scale in order to confirm your coding standards are being met. The intent is for automated means to ensure code adheres to a coding standard.
|
| SPR-276 |
The [organization] shall perform component analysis (a.k.a.origin analysis) for developed or acquired software.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15(7),RA-5}
|
|
| SPR-277 |
In coordination with [organization], the [organization] shall prioritize and remediate flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
|
Timely remediation reduces exploitation window. Coordination ensures mission continuity during patching. Documented prioritization demonstrates due diligence. Structured response enhances accountability.
|
| SPR-278 |
The [organization] shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}
|
Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized.
|
| SPR-279 |
The [organization] shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}
|
The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing.
|
| SPR-280 |
The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to deliver the system, component, or service with [Program-defined security configurations] implemented.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-4(5)}
|
For the spacecraft FSW, the defined security configuration could include to ensure the software does not contain a pre-defined list of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs)and/or CAT I/II Application STIGs.
|
| SPR-281 |
The [organization] shall have an Insider Threat Program to aid in the detection and prevention of people with authorized access to perform malicious activities.{SV-AC-4}{AT-2(2),IR-4(6),IR-4(7),PM-12,PM-16}
|
Formal insider programs provide monitoring, reporting, and mitigation mechanisms. Behavioral analysis strengthens early detection. Structured governance reduces insider impact. Policy-backed programs improve deterrence.
|
| SPR-282 |
The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)}
|
* The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers.
* All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government.
|
| SPR-283 |
The [organization] shall request threat analysis of suppliers of critical components and manage access to and control of threat analysis products containing U.S.person information.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-9,SA-12,SR-1}
|
The intent of this requirement is to address supply chain concerns on hardware and software vendors. Not required for trusted suppliers accredited to the Defense Microelectronic Activity (DMEA). If the Program intends to use a supplier not accredited by DMEA, the government customer should be notified as soon as possible. If the Program has internal processes to vet suppliers, it may meet this requirement. All software used and its origins must be included in the SBOM and be subjected to internal and Government vulnerability scans.
|
| SPR-284 |
The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis on threats to mission critical capabilities and/or system components to inform risk management decisions.{SV-MA-4}{PM-16,RA-3(2),RA-3(3),RA-7,RA-9,SA-12(8),SA-15(8)}
|
Intelligence-informed risk management anticipates adversary capabilities. External threat awareness improves proactive defense. Integration into decision-making strengthens resilience. Threat-informed design reduces reactive posture.
|
| SPR-285 |
The [organization] risk assessment shall include the full end to end communication pathway (i.e., round trip) to include any crosslink communications.{SV-MA-4}{AC-20,AC-20(1),AC-20(3),RA-3,SA-8(18)}
|
Full pathway analysis prevents overlooking intermediate segments. Crosslinks may introduce lateral risk exposure. Round-trip evaluation strengthens confidentiality and integrity assurance. Holistic view reduces blind spots.
|
| SPR-286 |
The [organization] shall conduct an assessment of risk prior to each milestone review [SRR\PDR\CDR], including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the platform and the information it processes, stores, or transmits.{SV-MA-4}{RA-2,RA-3,SA-8(25)}
|
Major design decisions must reflect updated threat posture. Pre-milestone risk review prevents costly redesign. Structured evaluation supports informed governance. Early risk integration enhances mission confidence.
|
| SPR-287 |
The [organization] shall document risk assessment results in [risk assessment report].{SV-MA-4}{RA-3}
|
Formal documentation preserves rationale for decisions. Traceability enables future reassessment. Written records support compliance. Documentation strengthens transparency.
|
| SPR-288 |
The [organization] shall review risk assessment results [At least annually if not otherwise defined in formal organizational policy].{SV-MA-4}{RA-3}
|
Periodic review ensures evolving threats are considered. Regular reassessment prevents stagnation. Continuous evaluation supports adaptive defense. Governance must be iterative.
|
| SPR-289 |
The [organization] shall update the risk assessment [At least annually if not otherwise defined in formal institutional policy] or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the spacecraft.{SV-MA-4}{RA-3}
|
System modifications alter risk posture. Immediate reassessment ensures continued compliance. Responsive review strengthens mission assurance. Risk management must be dynamic.
|
| SPR-290 |
The [organization] shall document risk assessment results in risk assessment report upon completion of each risk assessment.{SV-MA-6}{RA-3,RA-7}
|
Formal documentation preserves rationale for decisions. Traceability enables future reassessment. Written records support compliance. Documentation strengthens transparency.
|
| SPR-291 |
The [organization] shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-3(3),SA-11(2),SA-15(8),SI-3}
|
Security analysis should guide test design. Threat-informed evaluation improves relevance. Feedback loops strengthen defensive posture. Analytical alignment enhances coverage.
|
| SPR-292 |
The [organization] shall ensure that role-based security-related training is provided to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities: (i) before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties; (ii) when required by system changes; and (iii) at least annually thereafter.{SV-AC-4}{AT-3,CP-2}
|
Personnel must understand role-specific responsibilities. Tailored training reduces misuse. Continuous reinforcement maintains awareness. Human factors are central to defense.
|
| SPR-293 |
The [organization] shall employ techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the [organization]s supply chain.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-6}{CP-2,PM-30,SA-9,SA-12(5),SC-38,SR-3,SR-3(1),SR-3(2),SR-5(2)}
|
Adversaries often exploit supplier relationships. Protective measures reduce reconnaissance and manipulation. Supply chain resilience strengthens mission integrity. Proactive defense mitigates systemic exposure.
|
| SPR-294 |
The [organization] shall use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SA-15(8)}
|
|
| SPR-295 |
The [organization] shall perform and document threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SI-3}
|
Formal records preserve findings and mitigation strategies. Documentation supports lifecycle traceability. Transparent records enhance oversight. Governance requires evidence.
|
| SPR-296 |
The [organization] shall conduct an Attack Surface Analysis and reduce attack surfaces to a level that presents a low level of compromise by an attacker.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(6),SA-15(5)}
|
Reducing exposed interfaces lowers exploitation probability. Quantified surface reduction strengthens resilience. Structured assessment aligns design with mission risk tolerance. Minimization enhances defensive posture.
|
| SPR-297 |
The [organization] shall require the developer to conduct an attack surface analysis on the spacecraft architecture to identify and reduce attack surfaces to the lowest possible level that still permits the system to meet performance requirements/mission objectives.{SV-MA-6,SV-SP-1}{SA-11(6),SA-15(5)}
|
Embedding surface reduction into architecture strengthens foundational security. Early analysis prevents costly retrofits. Developer accountability ensures security by design. Integrated evaluation improves mission readiness.
|
| SPR-298 |
The [organization] shall require the developer to use threat modeling, attack surface analysis, and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SV-MA-6,SV-SP-1}{SA-15(8)}
|
Threat modeling anticipates adversary tactics. Early design adaptation reduces vulnerability exposure. Learning from similar systems improves efficiency. Proactive analysis reduces downstream risk.
|
| SPR-299 |
The [organization] shall develop, document, and maintain under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the spacecrafts.{SV-SP-9,SV-MA-6}{CM-2,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-8(30),SA-10}
|
Configuration control ensures traceability of hardware and software states. Unauthorized changes undermine security posture. Accurate baselines enable recovery and audit. Governance depends on configuration integrity.
|
| SPR-300 |
The [organization] shall maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data (hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current version.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-9}{CM-6,SA-8(21),SA-8(30),SA-10,SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(5),SI-7(10),SR-4(4)}
|
Build data linkage ensures reproducibility and traceability. Tampering detection depends on accurate mapping. Integrity of master copies prevents unauthorized modification. Configuration discipline supports resilience.
|
| SPR-301 |
The [organization] shall develop a security plan for the spacecraft.{SV-MA-6}{PL-2,PL-7,PM-1,SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}
|
A comprehensive security plan aligns controls with mission objectives. Clear articulation ensures consistent implementation. Planning integrates security into operations. Formal documentation strengthens accountability.
|
| SPR-302 |
The [organization] shall document the platform's security architecture, and how it is established within and is an integrated part of the overall [organization] mission security architecture.{SV-MA-6,SV-MA-4}{PL-7,SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SA-17}
|
Architecture documentation provides structural clarity. Integration into enterprise mission security ensures alignment. Clear documentation reduces misinterpretation. Transparency strengthens lifecycle governance.
|
| SPR-304 |
The [organization] shall maintain a list of suppliers and potential suppliers used, and the products that they supply to include software.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{CM-10,PL-8(2),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11)}
|
Ideally you have diversification with suppliers
|
| SPR-305 |
The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(8),CM-7(9),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-10(3),SA-19,SC-51,SR-4(3),SR-4(4),SR-5(2),SR-11}
|
Counterfeit hardware may embed malicious implants. Formal policies reduce infiltration risk. Supplier verification strengthens trust. Hardware authenticity is foundational to cybersecurity.
|
| SPR-306 |
The [organization] shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a sub [organization] to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-6}{PM-30,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-12(2),SR-5(2),SR-6}
|
Pre-contract review ensures vendor security posture. Due diligence reduces third-party risk exposure. Structured evaluation strengthens procurement governance. Supplier trust must be verified.
|
| SPR-307 |
The [organization] shall maintain documentation tracing the strategies, tools, and methods implemented to mitigate supply chain risk .{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-12(1),SR-5}
|
Examples include: (1) Transferring a portion of the risk to the developer or supplier through the use of contract language and incentives; (2) Using contract language that requires the implementation of SCRM throughout the system lifecycle in applicable contracts and other acquisition and assistance instruments (grants, cooperative agreements, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), and other transactions). Within the DOD some examples include: (a) Language outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook section 13.13. Contracting; (b) Language requiring the use of protected mechanisms to deliver elements and data about elements, processes, and delivery mechanisms; (c) Language that articulates that requirements flow down supply chain tiers to sub-prime suppliers. (3) Incentives for suppliers that: (a) Implement required security safeguards and SCRM best practices; (b) Promote transparency into their organizational processes and security practices; (c) Provide additional vetting of the processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system components, and services; and (d) Implement contract to reduce SC risk down the contract stack. (4) Gaining insight into supplier security practices; (5) Using contract language and incentives to enable more robust risk management later in the lifecycle; (6) Using a centralized intermediary or “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary;
|
| SPR-308 |
The [organization] shall protect against supply chain threats to the system, system components, or system services by employing security safeguards as defined by NIST SP 800-161 Rev.1.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SI-3,SR-1}
|
The chosen supply chain safeguards should demonstrably support a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy. Safeguards should include protections for both hardware and software. Program should define their critical components (HW & SW) and identify the supply chain protections, approach/posture/process.
|
| SPR-309 |
The [organization] shall identify the key system components or capabilities that require isolation through physical or logical means.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,SC-3,SC-7(13),SC-28(3),SC-32,SC-32(1)}
|
Fault management and security management capabilities would be classified as mission critical and likely need separated. Additionally, capabilities like TT&C, C&DH, GNC might need separated as well.
|
| SPR-310 |
The [organization] shall use a certified environment to develop, code and test executable software (firmware or bit-stream) that will be programmed into a one-time programmable FPGA or be programmed into non-volatile memory (NVRAM) that the FPGA executes.{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SC-51,SI-7(10),SR-1,SR-5}
|
|
| SPR-311 |
The [organization] shall ensure that all ASICs designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, and tested by suppliers with a Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) Trust accreditation.{spacecraft-SP-5} {SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}
|
Trusted microelectronics reduce hardware supply chain risk. DMEA accreditation strengthens assurance. Hardware-level compromise prevention protects mission integrity. Secure fabrication underpins secure systems.
|
| SPR-312 |
If using the Government Microelectronics Assessment for Trust (GOMAT) framework outright, to perform ASIC and FPGA threat/vulnerability risk assessment, the following requirements would apply: {SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
• 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
|
| SPR-313 |
The [organization] shall develop a plan for managing supply chain risks associated with the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of organization-defined systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-6}{SR-2}
|
Structured SCRM planning identifies lifecycle risks. Comprehensive coverage ensures holistic oversight. Risk planning mitigates systemic exposure. Governance extends beyond deployment.
|
| SPR-314 |
The [organization] shall protect the supply chain risk management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-SP-4}{SR-2}
|
Disclosure of SCRM strategy may expose defensive weaknesses. Controlled access preserves operational advantage. Plan integrity prevents tampering. Governance artifacts must be secured.
|
| SPR-315 |
The [organization] shall review and update the supply chain risk management plan as required, to address threats, organizational, or environmental changes.{SV-SP-4}{SR-2}
|
Threat landscapes evolve rapidly. Periodic updates maintain relevance. Adaptive management strengthens resilience. Continuous improvement is essential.
|
| SPR-316 |
The [organization] shall establish a supply chain risk management team to lead and support supply chain risk management activities.{SV-SP-4}{SR-2(1)}
|
Dedicated oversight ensures coordinated supply chain defense. Defined roles improve accountability. Central leadership streamlines mitigation efforts. Organizational focus strengthens resilience.
|
| SPR-317 |
The [organization] shall employ [organization]-defined techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the Program supply chain.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-3(2),SC-38}
|
Examples of security safeguards that the organization should consider implementing to limit the harm from potential adversaries targeting the organizational supply chain, are: (1) Using trusted physical delivery mechanisms that do not permit access to the element during delivery (ship via a protected carrier, use cleared/official couriers, or a diplomatic pouch); (2) Using trusted electronic delivery of products and services (require downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites); (3) Avoiding the purchase of custom configurations, where feasible; (4) Using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations), where feasible; (5) Using defensive design approaches; (6) Employing system OPSEC principles; (7) Employing a diverse set of suppliers; (8) Employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry; (9) Using a centralized intermediary and “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary Employing inventory management policies and processes; (10) Using flexible agreements during each acquisition and procurement phase so that it is possible to meet emerging needs or requirements to address supply chain risk without requiring complete revision or re-competition of an acquisition or procurement; (11) Using international, national, commercial or government standards to increase potential supply base; (12) Limiting the disclosure of information that can become publicly available; and (13) Minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required delivery.
|
| SPR-318 |
The [organization] shall ensure that the controls included in prime contracts are also included in the contracts of subcontractors.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-6}{SR-3(3)}
|
Security gaps in subcontractors create systemic vulnerabilities. Flow-down requirements enforce consistent standards. Contractual alignment strengthens supply chain assurance. Uniform governance reduces weak links.
|
| SPR-319 |
The [organization] shall ensure adequate supplies of critical system components.{SV-AV-7}{SR-5(1)}
|
Examples include: using multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for critical components, stockpiling spare components to ensure operation during mission-critical times, and the identification of functionally identical or similar components that may be used, if necessary.
|
| SPR-320 |
The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific configuration management policies and procedures for the hardware and software for the spacecraft. {SV-SP-9,SV-MA-6}{CM-1,CM-3,CM-5(6),SA-10,SA-10(3)}
|
Clear configuration governance prevents unauthorized modification. Policy-backed processes ensure consistency. Lifecycle control supports traceability. Managed change reduces mission risk.
|
| SPR-321 |
The [organization] shall develop and document spacecraft integrity policies covering both hardware and software. {SV-SP-5,SV-IT-3}{CM-5(6),SA-10(3),SI-1,SI-7(12)}
|
Integrity policies define expectations for hardware and software protection. Formalized governance ensures consistent enforcement. Clear standards reduce ambiguity. Integrity underpins mission trustworthiness.
|
| SPR-322 |
The [organization] shall retain at least two previous versions of all spacecraft associated software on the ground with the capability to restore previous version on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-2(3),CM-3(7),CM-4(2),SA-10,SA-10(4)}
|
Maintaining prior software versions enables rapid rollback in the event of faulty or malicious updates. In space systems, recovery options are limited once deployed. Retained versions preserve operational continuity and reduce mission impact. Controlled rollback strengthens resilience against supply chain or update-based compromise.
|
| SPR-323 |
The [organization] prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{CM-7(8),CM-7(8),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-10(2),SI-3,SR-4(4)}
|
|
| SPR-325 |
The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures, in coordination with the [CIO], that is demonstrably consistent with the anti-counterfeit policy defined by the Program office.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{SR-11}
|
Consistent anti-counterfeit policy ensures supply chain integrity across organizational boundaries. Alignment with Program office guidance prevents inconsistent enforcement. Counterfeit components introduce reliability and malicious implant risks. Formal policy strengthens procurement assurance.
|
| SPR-327 |
The [organization] shall document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance of critical system components and associated data in accordance with the Supply Chain Risk Management Plan.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4,SR-4(1),SR-4(2)}
|
Traceable provenance reduces supply chain opacity and hidden dependency risk. Documentation of origin enables vulnerability tracking and recall response. Monitoring component lineage strengthens trust in deployed hardware and software. Transparency enhances lifecycle accountability.
|
| SPR-328 |
The [organization] shall ensure any update to on-board software, memory, or stored procedures has met high assurance standards before execution. {SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{AC-3(2),CM-3,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SR-4(4)}
|
On-orbit updates carry significant risk if not validated. High assurance standards prevent unauthorized or corrupted uploads from executing. Structured validation protects system integrity. Update governance reduces mission-ending configuration errors.
|
| SPR-329 |
The [organization] shall perform manual code review of all produced code looking for quality, maintainability, and security flaws.{SV-SP-1}{SA-11(4),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4)}
|
Automated tools may miss contextual or logic-based flaws. Manual review improves detection of subtle security weaknesses. Human analysis enhances code quality and maintainability. Combined approaches strengthen overall assurance.
|
| SPR-330 |
The [organization] shall employ the [organization]-defined approaches for the purchase of the system, system components, or system services from suppliers.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-5}
|
This could include tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods.
|
| SPR-331 |
The [organization] shall test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects on mission systems in a separate test environment before installation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(2),CM-4(1),CM-4(2),CM-10(1),SA-8(31),SA-11(9),SI-2,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-5(2)}
|
This requirement is focused on software and firmware flaws. If hardware flaw remediation is required, refine the requirement to make this clear.
|
| SPR-332 |
The [organization] shall employ [Selection (one or more): independent third-party analysis, Program penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of [Program-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6(1)}
|
Third-party testing identifies weaknesses across suppliers and processes. Independent review strengthens trust in acquisition channels. Broader testing scope reduces systemic risk. Supply chain validation enhances mission security posture.
|
| SPR-335 |
The [organization] shall document the spacecraft's security architecture, and how it is established within and is an integrated part of the Program's mission security architecture.{SV-MA-6}{SA-17}
|
|
| SPR-336 |
The [organization] (and Prime Contractor) shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6}
|
|
| SPR-337 |
The [organization] shall ensure that the list of potential system vulnerabilities scanned is updated [prior to a new scan] {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5(2),SI-3}
|
Outdated vulnerability signatures reduce detection capability. Updating scan definitions ensures coverage against emerging threats. Proactive updates prevent blind spots. Continuous refresh strengthens scanning effectiveness.
|
| SPR-338 |
The [organization] shall define the frequency for providing refresher security awareness training to all information system users (including managers, senior executives, and [organization]s).{SV-AC-4}{AT-2}
|
Regular reinforcement maintains security awareness. Training frequency should reflect mission risk and evolving threat landscape. Structured scheduling ensures consistency. Ongoing education supports defense readiness.
|
| SPR-339 |
The [organization] shall ensure that basic security awareness training is provided to all information system users (including managers, senior executives, and [organization]s) as part of initial training for new users, when required by information system changes, and at frequency defined by the [organization].{SV-AC-4}{AT-2}
|
Baseline awareness reduces human error and insider risk. Training at onboarding and after system changes ensures up-to-date knowledge. All user levels require awareness, including executives. Human factors remain a core defense layer.
|
| SPR-343 |
The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific access control policies for controlling information flow and leakage on-board the spacecraft.{SV-AC-1,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-3}{AC-1,AC-3,AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-3(13)}
|
Access control policies must reflect mission architecture and threat environment. Formal documentation ensures consistent enforcement. Leakage prevention requires clear governance. Policy clarity supports compliance and auditing.
|
| SPR-344 |
The [organization] shall have Insider Threat Program to aid in the prevention of people with authorized access to perform malicious activities.{SV-AC-4}{PM-12,AT-2(2),IR-4(7)}
|
Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
|
| SPR-345 |
The [organization] shall update the inventory of spacecraft components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and spacecraft updates.{SV-MA-4,SV-SP-4}{CM-8(1),CA-7,CM-2,CM-3}
|
Accurate inventory enables vulnerability tracking and incident response. Lifecycle updates prevent undocumented changes. Asset visibility strengthens security management. Configuration awareness reduces blind spots.
|
| SPR-346 |
The [organization] shall implement, as part of an A&A process, a Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP) that evaluates the effectiveness of security control implementations on a recurring pre-defined basis.{SV-DCO-1}{CA-7,PM-31}
|
Ongoing evaluation detects drift in control effectiveness. Continuous monitoring strengthens adaptive defense. Recurring review identifies degradation early. Proactive oversight enhances resilience.
|
| SPR-347 |
The [organization] shall establish a cross-discipline insider threat incident response & handling team.{SV-AC-4}{PM-12}
|
Complex insider risks require multi-domain coordination. Cross-functional teams improve detection and response. Unified oversight strengthens accountability. Structured programs deter malicious behavior.
|
| SPR-348 |
The [organization] shall establish policy and procedures to prevent unauthorized personnel from masquerading as personnel with valid access to areas where commanding of the spacecraft is possible.{SV-AC-4,SV-AC-1}{PM-12}
|
Unauthorized impersonation risks mission compromise. Physical and logical controls prevent access misuse. Clear policy deters credential abuse. Identity assurance is essential for command authority.
|
| SPR-349 |
The [organization] shall establish and maintain a comprehensive program for testing, training, and monitoring to ensure the effectiveness of security controls and incident response capabilities.{SV-DCO-1,SV-MA-5}{PM-14}
|
Integrated programs ensure controls remain effective. Continuous validation supports adaptive security posture. Combined testing and training reduce complacency. Holistic oversight strengthens mission readiness.
|
| SPR-350 |
The [organization] shall screen all personnel supporting management and development to ensure they meet the appropriate ADP/IT level designation requirements IAW DoD 5200.2-R prior to authorizing access to the information or system.{SV-AC-4}{PS-3}
|
Personnel vetting reduces insider risk exposure. Compliance with DoD screening standards ensures appropriate trust levels. Credentialed access must align with sensitivity. Governance strengthens workforce integrity.
|
| SPR-351 |
The [organization], upon termination of individual employment, disables information system access within [TBD minutes] of termination.{SV-AC-4}{PS-4}
|
Prompt access revocation reduces residual insider risk. Delay creates opportunity for misuse. Defined timelines ensure enforceable standards. Termination governance protects system integrity.
|
| SPR-352 |
The [organization] shall maintain records of termination/revocation of any authenticators/credentials.{SV-AC-4}{PS-4}
|
Recordkeeping ensures accountability and traceability. Historical data supports audits and investigations. Documentation strengthens governance oversight. Proper revocation tracking reduces risk of reinstatement errors.
|
| SPR-353 |
The [organization] shall, upon termination of individual employment, terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual.{SV-AC-4,SV-AC-1}{PS-4}
|
Immediate revocation prevents credential reuse. Deprovisioning reduces exposure window. Controlled offboarding supports lifecycle security. Identity lifecycle management is critical.
|
| SPR-354 |
The [organization], upon termination of individual employment, disables information system access within 3 minutes of termination.{SV-AC-4}{PS-4}
|
Immediate revocation reduces exposure window. Controlled offboarding supports lifecycle security. Reducing system access helps prevent abuse.
|
| SPR-355 |
The [organization] shall implement policies and procedures to support operations security (OPSEC) to protect information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying, controlling, and protecting information related to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities.{SV-CF-3}{SC-38}
|
Information critical to organizational mission and business functions may include user identities, components in use, suppliers, supply chain processes, functional requirements, security requirements, system design specifications, testing and evaluation protocols, and security control implementation details.
|
| SPR-356 |
The [organization] shall have a two-man rule to achieve a high level of security for systems with command level access to the spacecraft.(Under this rule all access and actions require the presence of two authorized people at all times.) {SV-AC-4}{PE-3}
|
Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
|
| SPR-357 |
The [organization] defines the security safeguards to be employed to protect the availability of system resources.{CP-2(2),SC-6,SI-13,SI-17}
|
|
| SPR-386 |
The [organization] shall implement automated mechanisms to assist in the execution and implementation of the Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP).{SV-DCO-1}{CA-7(6)}
|
Automation ensures continuous monitoring activities are consistent, repeatable, and not dependent on manual effort. Space systems generate large volumes of telemetry that require automated analysis to detect trends and anomalies. Automation reduces human error and accelerates response timelines. This strengthens adaptive security posture over the mission lifecycle.
|
| SPR-390 |
The [organization] shall ensure that cryptographic mechanisms, including authentication schemes and command dictionaries, are under strict configuration management.{SV-AC-3,SV-IT-2}{CM-3(6)}
|
Cryptographic algorithms, keys, and command dictionaries are foundational trust elements. Strict configuration control prevents unauthorized changes that could weaken security. Version tracking supports forensic reconstruction. Governance ensures cryptographic integrity across lifecycle phases.
|
| SPR-391 |
The [organization] shall release updated versions of the mission information systems incorporating security-relevant software and firmware updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than [Program-defined frequency [90 days]].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(2),CM-4(1)}
|
On-orbit patching/upgrades may be necessary if vulnerabilities are discovered after launch. The system should have the ability to update software post-launch.
|
| SPR-392 |
The [organization] shall review proposed changes to the spacecraft, assessing both mission and security impacts.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10,CM-3(2)}
|
Changes may introduce unintended security regression. Structured review balances mission needs with risk tolerance. Joint mission-security assessment prevents single-domain blind spots. Integrated evaluation supports safe modernization.
|
| SPR-393 |
The [organization] shall confirm that the operational spacecrafts correspond to the baseline configuration. {SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-2,CM-3,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-10}
|
Configuration drift undermines trust and auditability. Confirming alignment ensures deployed assets reflect approved design. Baseline validation supports recovery and compliance. Continuous verification reduces unknown risk.
|
| SPR-394 |
The [organization] shall implement a two-person rule, or similar dual authorization mechanism, for all changes to the SV configuration, and such actions should only be conducted with documented change control board approval.{SV-AC-4}{CM-3(8)}
|
Dual authorization reduces insider threat and accidental misconfiguration. Change board approval ensures structured governance. Sensitive changes require accountability. Multi-party validation enhances resilience.
|
| SPR-395 |
The [organization] shall prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(8)}
|
Closed binaries from unverified sources limit vulnerability inspection. Source availability supports transparency and review. Prohibiting opaque code reduces hidden malicious logic risk. Supply chain integrity depends on verifiability.
|
| SPR-396 |
The [organization] shall perform configuration management during system, component, or service during [design; development; implementation; operations].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10}
|
Configuration discipline ensures traceability from design through operations. Lifecycle oversight prevents undocumented changes. Structured management supports rollback and audit. Configuration integrity underpins mission assurance.
|
| SPR-397 |
The [organization] shall create prioritized list of software weakness classes (e.g., Common Weakness Enumerations) to be used during static code analysis for prioritization of static analysis results.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(1),SA-15(7)}
|
The prioritized list of CWEs should be created considering operational environment, attack surface, etc. Results from the threat modeling and attack surface analysis should be used as inputs into the CWE prioritization process. There is also a CWSS (https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html) process that can be used to prioritize CWEs. The prioritized list of CWEs can help with tools selection as well as you select tools based on their ability to detect certain high priority CWEs.
|
| SPR-398 |
The [organization] shall perform a manual code review of all flight code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(4)}
|
Flight code governs mission-critical behavior. Manual review detects subtle logic flaws missed by automation. Human expertise enhances safety assurance. Defense-in-depth requires layered validation.
|
| SPR-399 |
The [organization] shall define acceptable coding languages to be used by the software developer.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15}
|
Standardized languages reduce complexity and maintenance burden. Approved languages support secure development practices. Language governance strengthens code quality and review consistency. Reduced heterogeneity improves assurance.
|
| SPR-400 |
The [organization] shall define acceptable secure coding standards for use by the software developers.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15}
|
Secure coding standards mitigate common vulnerability patterns. Structured guidance reduces CWE-class weaknesses. Enforcing standards promotes predictable behavior. Governance supports sustainable security hygiene.
|
| SPR-401 |
The [organization] shall correct reported cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2}
|
* Although this requirement is stated to specifically apply to cybersecurity-related flaws, the Program office may choose to broaden it to all SV flaws.
* This requirement is allocated to the Program, as it is presumed, they have the greatest knowledge of the components of the system and when identified flaws apply.
|
| SPR-402 |
The [organization] shall identify, report, and coordinate correction of cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2}
|
Centralized reporting ensures timely remediation. Coordinated correction prevents repeated exposure. Documentation strengthens audit traceability. Rapid flaw management reduces exploitation window.
|
| SPR-403 |
The [organization] shall develop and document an inventory of the spacecraft components that accurately reflects the to-be launched system. {SV-MA-4,SV-SP-4}{CM-8,CM-2}
|
Accurate inventory enables vulnerability tracking and configuration validation. Knowing what is deployed supports incident response. Inventory integrity strengthens supply chain assurance. Visibility reduces systemic blind spots.
|
| SPR-404 |
The [organization] shall establish and formally review the baseline configuration to confirm that it represents an agreed-upon set of specifications for the spacecrafts.{SV-SP-4}{CM-2,CM-6}
|
Formal baseline review ensures consensus on spacecraft specifications. Structured validation prevents silent drift. Agreement strengthens accountability. Baseline governance supports mission reliability.
|
| SPR-405 |
The [organization] shall define/maintain an approved operating system list for use on spacecraft.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(5)}
|
The operating system is extremely important to security and availability of the spacecraft, therefore should receive high levels of assurance that it operates as intended and free of critical weaknesses/vulnerabilities.
|
| SPR-406 |
The [organization] shall track security advisories, patches/updates, and ensure compliance with license agreements and usage restrictions for all software within the SBOM.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-4}{CM-10}
|
Software dependencies evolve over time. Tracking advisories prevents latent vulnerability exposure. SBOM transparency enables rapid risk assessment. Compliance monitoring strengthens lifecycle resilience.
|
| SPR-407 |
The [organization] shall maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for all software code utilized and continuously update/revise the SBOM for each step in the software lifecycle (to include the deployment of that software).{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-4}{CM-8}
|
Continuous SBOM updates ensure accurate dependency tracking. Lifecycle revision captures changes in deployed components. Accurate SBOMs enable vulnerability correlation. Transparency enhances supply chain integrity.
|
| SPR-408 |
The [organization] shall produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness. The plan shall explicitly cover the space platform and link segment telemetry, automated anomaly detection, and SOC correlation of uplink, crosslink, and payload communications.{SV-DCO-1,SV-IT-1,SV-AV-1}{SA-4(8),CP-4(5),PM-31}
|
Comprehensive coverage ensures both onboard and communication segments are monitored. Telemetry-driven detection strengthens anomaly awareness. SOC correlation integrates space and ground visibility. Structured planning enhances detection capability.
|
| SPR-409 |
The [organization] shall ensure security representatives are included in all change control board reviews and decisions.{SV-MA-6}{CM-3(4),SA-10(7)}
|
Security oversight during change decisions prevents risk oversight. Cross-functional review reduces blind spots. Integrated governance balances operational urgency with protection. Participation ensures consistent enforcement.
|
| SPR-410 |
The [organization] shall define, document, and approve access restrictions associated with changes to the spacecraft.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-4}{CM-5}
|
Changes to spacecraft configuration must be controlled. Clear restrictions prevent unauthorized modification. Structured access governance reduces insider risk. Accountability supports traceability.
|
| SPR-415 |
The [organization] shall engage relevant stakeholders to discuss performance impacts/tradeoffs for implementing the desired monitoring approach, document any deviations from initial desired approach, and ensure the Authorizing Official (AO) signs off on the risk posed by the exclusion of the functionality in question.{SV-DCO-1,SV-AV-3,SV-AV-2}{AU-2}
|
Aerospace work published in TOR-2019-02178 "Telemetry Security" provides examples of telemetry values that may be useful to monitor for indications of malicious onboard activity (not a comprehensive list):
Vehicle Command Counter (VCC)
Rejected Command Counter
Command Receiver On/Off Mode
Command Receivers Received Signal Strength
Command Receiver Lock Modes
Telemetry Downlink Modes
Cryptographic Modes
Received Commands
System Clock
GPS Ephemeris
Watchdog Timer (WDT)
|
| SPR-416 |
The [organization] shall identify and document the on-board events and values that will be monitored for indicators of unexpected or malicious activity.{SV-DCO-1,SV-IT-1}{AU-2}
|
Aerospace work published in TOR-2019-02178 "Telemetry Security" provides examples of telemetry values that may be useful to monitor for indications of malicious onboard activity (not a comprehensive list):
Vehicle Command Counter (VCC)
Rejected Command Counter
Command Receiver On/Off Mode
Command Receivers Received Signal Strength
Command Receiver Lock Modes
Telemetry Downlink Modes
Cryptographic Modes
Received Commands
System Clock
GPS Ephemeris
Watchdog Timer (WDT)
|
| SPR-434 |
The [organization] shall determine criteria for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions for all communications to/from the spacecraft.{SV-DCO-1,SV-IT-1}{SI-4(4)}
|
Clear anomaly criteria enable consistent detection. Defined thresholds prevent subjective interpretation. Structured definitions strengthen monitoring logic. Proactive detection improves response speed.
|
| SPR-435 |
For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is not accredited, the [organization] shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by [organization]. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}
|
DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
|
| SPR-436 |
The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}
|
Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
|
| SPR-437 |
The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-10(1),SI-3,SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-4(4)}
|
* The integrity verification mechanisms may include:
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
|
| SPR-438 |
Any EEEE or mechanical piece parts that cannot be procured from the OCM or their authorized distribution network shall be approved and the government program office notified to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts and materials.{SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}
|
The Program, working with the contractors, shall identify which ASICs/FPGAs perform or execute an integral part of mission critical functions and if the supplier is accredited “Trusted” by DMEA. If the contractor is not accredited by DMEA, then the Program may apply various of the below ASIC/FPGA assurance requirements to the contractor, and the Program may need to perform a risk assessment of the contractor’s design environment.
|
| SPR-439 |
For ASICs that are designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, or tested by a supplier that is not DMEA accredited, the ASIC development shall undergo a threat/vulnerability risk assessment. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the ASIC.{SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-4(4),SR-5}
|
DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
|
| SPR-440 |
Any EEEE or mechanical piece parts that cannot be procured from the OCM or their authorized franchised distribution network shall be approved by the [organization]’s Parts, Materials and Processes Control Board (PMPCB) as well as the government program office to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts and materials.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
The Program, working with the contractors, shall identify which ASICs/FPGAs perform or execute an integral part of mission critical functions and if the supplier is accredited “Trusted” by DMEA. If the contractor is not accredited by DMEA, then the Program may apply various of the below ASIC/FPGA assurance requirements to the contractor, and the Program may need to perform a risk assessment of the contractor’s design environment.
|
| SPR-441 |
For ASICs that are designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, or tested by a supplier that is NOT DMEA accredited Trusted, the ASIC development shall undergo a threat/vulnerability risk assessment.The assessment shall use Aerospace security guidance and requirements tailored from TOR-2019-00506 Vol.2, and TOR-2019-02543 ASIC and FPGA Risk Assessment Process and Checklist.Based on the results of the risk assessment, the Program may require the developer to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the ASIC.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
|
| SPR-442 |
For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is NOT DMEA accredited Trusted, the contractor/developer shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by the Program.The assessment shall use Aerospace security guidance and requirements in TOR-2019-00506 Vol.2, and TOR-2019-02543 ASIC and FPGA Risk Assessment Process and Checklist.Based on the results of the risk assessment, the Program may require the developer to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
|
| SPR-443 |
The [organization] shall ensure that the contractors/developers have all ASICs designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, and tested by suppliers with a Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) Trust accreditation.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
|
| SPR-444 |
The [organization] shall ensure that the contractors/developers have all EEEE, and mechanical piece parts procured from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) or their authorized franchised distribution network.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
These requirements might only make sense for ASIC/FPGA that are deemed to support mission critical functions. The Program has the responsibility to identify all ASICs and FPGAs that are used in all flight hardware by each hardware element. This list must include all contractor and subcontractor usage of ASICs and FPGAs.
|
| SPR-445 |
The [organization] shall use a DMEA certified environment to develop, code and test executable software (firmware or bit-stream) that will be programmed into a one-time programmable FPGA or be programmed into non-volatile memory (NVRAM) that the FPGA executes.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
|
DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
|
| SPR-446 |
The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of hardware components.{SV-SP-5,SV-SP-4}{SA-10(3),SA-8(21),SA-10(3),SC-51}
|
* The integrity verification mechanisms may include:
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
|
| SPR-447 |
The [organization] shall have physical security controls to prevent unauthorized access to the systems that have the ability to command the spacecraft.{SV-AC-4}{PE-3}
|
Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
|
| SPR-448 |
The [organization] shall define security requirements/configurations for development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-10}{SA-15}
|
Source code should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally source code would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. NIST 800-171 is insufficient when protecting highly sensitive unclassified information and more robust controls from NIST SP 800-53 and CNSSI 1253 should be employed. Greater scrutiny must be applied to all development environments.
|
| SPR-450 |
The [spacecraft] shall prevent flight software and payload applications from modifying access control labels or rules and shall validate label integrity at startup and during policy updates.{SV-AC-1,SV-IT-2}{AC-3(3),AC-3(11).AC-16,SI-7}
|
Label integrity ensures policy decisions remain trustworthy. Preventing modification protects data classification enforcement. Validation at startup prevents persistent compromise. Policy integrity underpins MAC assurance.
|
| SPR-452 |
The [spacecraft] shall deny commands, data requests, and connections from revoked identities and shall generate an audit record for each denial.{SV-AC-4,SV-DCO-1}{AC-3,AC-3(8),AU-2,AU-12}
|
Explicit denial and logging strengthens accountability. Automated enforcement reduces reliance on manual monitoring. Recorded denials support forensic investigation. Policy adherence strengthens defense.
|
| SPR-453 |
The [spacecraft] shall restrict any override of access control mechanisms to [Program-defined emergency conditions] and shall generate an auditable event for each invocation that includes the time, origin, justification code, affected functions, and exit status.{SV-AC-4}{AC-3,AC-3(10),AU-2,AU-3}
|
Overrides introduce risk and must be tightly constrained. Auditable invocation ensures accountability. Time-limited emergency use reduces misuse potential. Structured control preserves integrity.
|
| SPR-454 |
The [spacecraft] shall tag telemetry and logs produced during override and shall automatically restore standard enforcement when exit conditions are met or after [Program-defined timeout].{SV-AC-4,SV-DCO-1}{AC-3(10),AU-3,AU-12}
|
Override transparency ensures operators are aware of elevated state. Automatic restoration prevents lingering weakened posture. Structured tagging supports audit and review. Governance reduces accidental persistence.
|
| SPR-455 |
The [spacecraft] shall restrict access to flight software executables, cryptographic material, command dictionaries, and [organization]-defined sensitive payload data to the privileged execution domain and shall deny all other access by default.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3,SV-IT-3}{AC-3(11),AC-6}
|
Flight executables and cryptographic materials are high-value targets. Restricting access reduces exploitation pathways. Default deny enforces least privilege. Segmentation enhances resilience.
|
| SPR-456 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement OS or hardware enforcement for these restrictions and shall log any attempted access violations.{SV-AC-1,SV-DCO-1}{AC-3,AC-3(11)}
|
Hardware-enforced policy is harder to bypass than software-only controls. Logging violations supports detection and response. Layered enforcement strengthens assurance. Technical barriers reinforce governance intent.
|
| SPR-460 |
The [spacecraft] shall record transitive forwarding decisions and rejections in cyber relevant audit data for downlink.{SV-DCO-1}{CA-3(7),AU-3,AU-12}
|
Audit records of forwarding and rejection decisions enable forensic reconstruction. Visibility into routing logic prevents covert channel abuse. Logged rejections demonstrate enforcement of policy. Downlink visibility strengthens ground oversight.
|
| SPR-461 |
The [spacecraft] shall fail over mission critical processing to a redundant onboard compute element while maintaining authentication, authorization, and cryptographic protections.{SV-MA-5}{CP-2(6),CP-10}
|
Redundant compute without preserved security controls introduces new risk. Failover must maintain authentication and cryptographic state. Secure redundancy prevents availability from undermining integrity. Resilience must not weaken protection.
|
| SPR-463 |
The [spacecraft] shall maintain configuration and cryptographic synchronization required to activate alternate processing or storage and shall verify the alternate before activation.{SV-SP-9,SV-AC-3}{CP-2(6),CM-2}
|
Activation of alternate nodes requires synchronized keys and configurations. Unsynchronized failover risks data corruption or exposure. Verification before activation prevents propagation of compromised states. Coordinated readiness supports secure recovery.
|
| SPR-464 |
The [spacecraft] shall accept command and telemetry sessions from [organization]-authorized alternate ground or relay providers only when presented with valid cryptographic credentials and whitelisted link characteristics.{SV-IT-1,SV-AC-4,SV-MA-7}{AC-17,SC-23}
|
Accepting sessions only from authorized, cryptographically verified providers prevents rogue ground station compromise. Whitelisted link characteristics reduce spoofing risk. Strict admission control strengthens link-layer assurance. This supports TRANSEC alignment.
|
| SPR-467 |
The [spacecraft] shall maintain an onboard inventory of mission components, including unique identifiers, firmware versions or hashes, configuration state, and operational status, and shall downlink the inventory at [organization]-defined intervals and upon any change.{SV-MA-4,SV-SP-4}{PE-20,CM-8}
|
Real-time inventory visibility enables anomaly detection and supply chain verification. Downlinked fingerprints support ground-based validation. Continuous attestation strengthens configuration assurance. Transparency reduces silent tampering risk.
|
| SPR-468 |
The [spacecraft] shall detect and report the connection of any unauthorized or unknown component to onboard interfaces.{SV-SP-5,SV-SP-4}{PE-20,CM-8(3),SI-4}
|
Hardware implants pose existential mission risk. Detection of unknown components prevents covert insertion. Automated alerting reduces dwell time. Inventory integrity supports physical security.
|
| SPR-469 |
The [spacecraft] shall log component activation, deactivation, replacement, and firmware updates with timestamps that map to UTC.{SV-SP-9,SV-DCO-1}{AU-3,AU-8}
|
Lifecycle logging ensures traceability. UTC mapping supports synchronized forensic analysis. Transparent change history reduces repudiation. Logging strengthens accountability.
|
| SPR-472 |
The [organization] shall define mission and business processes that map mission objectives to space-segment security requirements, including safe-mode criteria, secure uplink and downlink obligations, and recovery procedures, and shall baseline these processes under configuration control.{SV-MA-6,SV-AV-5}{PM-11,PL-2,CM-2}
|
Security must align with mission objectives. Explicit mapping ensures safe-mode criteria and communication obligations are controlled. Baseline governance prevents undocumented deviations. Integration supports mission assurance.
|
| SPR-476 |
The [organization] shall identify suppliers of mission-critical or mission-essential items and apply enhanced oversight that includes security practice vetting, contract language mandating secure manufacturing, and periodic compliance audits.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{PM-30(1),SR-6,SR-3}
|
Mission-critical suppliers require elevated scrutiny. Contractual language enforces security standards. Periodic audits reduce supply chain risk. Oversight strengthens systemic assurance.
|
| SPR-477 |
The [organization] shall require independent testing and inspection of mission-critical components prior to integration to verify hardware integrity and cryptographic module assurance.{SV-SP-5,SV-AC-3}{PM-30(1),SR-11}
|
Third-party validation reduces conflict-of-interest risk. Independent inspection verifies hardware integrity and cryptographic assurance. External attestation strengthens confidence. Verification supports mission-critical trust.
|
| SPR-478 |
The [organization] shall map supplier failure impact to mission functions and assign risk-based oversight and acceptance criteria.{SV-SP-4,SV-MA-6}{PM-30(1),SR-2,RA-3}
|
Understanding supplier failure impact informs oversight priority. Risk-based criteria ensure proportional governance. Structured assessment prevents blind spots. Supply chain risk alignment strengthens mission resilience.
|
| SPR-479 |
The [organization] shall define, baseline, and maintain the purposing of the space platform and link segment, including intended objectives, authorized capabilities, prohibited functions, and operational constraints, and shall use this baseline to bound requirements, updates, and on-orbit operations.{SV-AC-8,SV-MA-6}{PM-32,PL-8}
|
Defining authorized and prohibited functions prevents scope creep. Clear purposing bounds updates and operational use. Governance limits misuse potential. Structured baseline supports disciplined operations.
|
| SPR-481 |
The [organization] shall define and document data ownership for mission data types across the space platform and link segment, including authority over classification, storage, retention, distribution, cross-domain transfer, and decommissioning.{SV-CF-3}{SA-4(12)}
|
Clear authority over mission data reduces ambiguity. Defined classification and retention policies prevent mishandling. Ownership governance strengthens accountability. Structured control supports compliance.
|
| SPR-482 |
The [organization] shall require alternative configuration management and acceptance processes for suppliers lacking mature CM, including trusted build reproduction, cryptographic evidence of provenance, and hardware-in-the-loop acceptance testing prior to integration.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SA-10(2),CM-2}
|
Suppliers lacking mature CM require compensating controls. Trusted build reproduction and cryptographic evidence reduce risk. Hardware-in-the-loop testing validates integration integrity. Structured mitigation preserves assurance.
|
| SPR-483 |
The [organization] shall require trusted generation of flight and payload software and configuration baselines in a controlled build environment that enforces signed commits, reproducible builds, cryptographic hashing, and code signing of release artifacts, and shall maintain a configuration-controlled golden image for comparison and rollback.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-10(4)}
|
Controlled builds prevent unauthorized code injection. Reproducible builds strengthen supply chain transparency. Golden images support rollback and forensic validation. Configuration control strengthens integrity.
|
| SPR-484 |
The [organization] shall employ interactive application security testing within spacecraft simulation or hardware-in-the-loop test benches to observe flight software runtime behavior, capture memory use, API calls, and data flows, and shall identify and report vulnerabilities prior to integration.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-7}{SA-11(9)}
|
Runtime behavior analysis detects dynamic vulnerabilities. Hardware-in-the-loop testing reveals integration flaws. Early detection reduces costly remediation. Testing strengthens secure development lifecycle.
|
| SPR-485 |
The [organization] shall require that IAST results are recorded as assessment evidence and shall block promotion of builds with unresolved high-severity findings to the flight baseline.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3}{SA-11(9)}
|
Preventing promotion of vulnerable builds protects mission integrity. Enforced gating ensures accountability. Security evidence supports auditability. Quality control strengthens assurance.
|
| SPR-489 |
The [spacecraft] shall host privileged functions, including flight control and cryptographic key management, in physically separate processing domains that have no direct data bus connectivity to non privileged domains. {SV-AC-6,SV-AC-3}{SC-3,SC-32(1),SC-39}
|
Hardware-level separation prevents software bypass. Isolation protects flight control and key management. Physical boundaries strengthen trust. Segmentation enforces zero-trust architecture.
|
| SPR-490 |
The [spacecraft] shall ensure cross domain exchanges occur only through [organization] defined, verified guards that enforce format, rate, and content checks.{SV-AC-6,SV-IT-2}{AC-4,SC-7,SC-32(1)}
|
Verified guards ensure controlled data exchange. Format and rate checks prevent covert channel exploitation. Enforced mediation supports mandatory control. Guarded exchange strengthens isolation.
|
| SPR-495 |
The [spacecraft] shall detect impending failure of security components and initiate controlled failover to preserve confidentiality, integrity, and availability.{SV-MA-5,SV-DCO-1}{SI-4,SI-13,CP-10}
|
Early detection prevents cascading compromise. Controlled switchover maintains CIA properties. Structured alerting enhances situational awareness. Fault handling preserves assurance.
|
| SPR-496 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide standby instances for [organization]-defined high-criticality security components and automatically switch to the standby upon failure detection, generating an immediate alert that includes the component identity, time, and fault reason.{SV-MA-5}{SI-13(4),CP-10,AU-5}
|
Automatic failover reduces human delay. Immediate alerts support oversight. Identity and fault logging strengthen accountability. Resilient architecture supports mission continuity.
|
| SPR-501 |
The [organization] shall assign and record unique cryptographic identities for flight-critical hardware components, firmware images, and software builds and shall maintain an authoritative registry mapping identities to approved suppliers and versions.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(1),IA-3}
|
Unique identities enable provenance tracking. Registry mapping supports supplier validation. Identity governance strengthens supply chain assurance. Structured attestation supports lifecycle integrity.
|
| SPR-502 |
The [spacecraft] shall report component and software identities and version fingerprints in telemetry at boot and upon changes to support provenance verification.{SV-SP-4,SV-MA-4}{SR-4(1),IA-3}
|
On-orbit reporting enables real-time provenance verification. Version fingerprints support anomaly detection. Transparency reduces silent drift. Telemetry-based attestation strengthens oversight.
|
| SPR-503 |
The [organization] shall validate authenticity and integrity of all flight-designated hardware, firmware, and software upon receipt using program-controlled trust anchors (approved vendor list, golden hash/cert manifest){SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(3),SR-11,SI-7}
|
Receipt validation prevents counterfeit or tampered parts integration. Program-controlled trust anchors ensure consistency. Early detection reduces downstream risk. Intake verification strengthens SCRM posture.
|
| SPR-504 |
The [organization] shall re-validate component identity (serial/lot), firmware measurements (cryptographic hashes), and certificate status immediately prior to installation, writing results to the SCRM/provenance ledger and blocking install on mismatch.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(3),SR-11,SI-7}
|
Installation-time validation prevents stale or revoked components. Ledger recording strengthens traceability. Blocking on mismatch prevents compromise propagation. Continuous verification enhances assurance.
|
| SPR-505 |
The [spacecraft] shall cryptographically verify boot images and configurations at power-on and after any update{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-9}{SR-4(3),SI-7,CM-14}
|
Secure boot prevents execution of unauthorized code. Post-update verification ensures integrity continuity. Root-of-trust enforcement protects mission-critical logic. Deterministic startup strengthens resilience.
|
| SPR-506 |
The [organization] supplier shall provide a signed pedigree for each critical flight item (COTS/ASIC/FPGA/embedded SW library) including: manufacturing lot/wafer, test results and environmental/rad-hard certs, sub-tier sources, workforce vetting attestation as required, and full chain-of-custody events; the program shall store/track this in the SCRM/provenance ledger.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(4),SR-6}
|
Signed pedigree documents manufacturing and handling lineage. Chain-of-custody transparency reduces counterfeit risk. Ledger tracking strengthens auditability. Supply chain evidence supports mission trust.
|
| SPR-507 |
The [organization] shall require independent lab attestations (e.g., rad-hardness, crypto module validation) for mission-essential/crypto-bearing parts; acceptance requires labs from an approved list.{SV-SP-5}{SR-4(4),SR-6}
|
Third-party validation strengthens assurance of rad-hardness and crypto modules. Approved lab lists reduce conflict of interest. Independent evidence increases confidence. Verification strengthens acceptance criteria.
|
| SPR-508 |
Within [organization]-defined window (e.g.,30/60/90 days) before integration or stow, the pedigree shall be re-verified and seals/marks inspected to detect substitution{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(4),SR-11,PE-16}
|
Time between receipt and integration creates substitution risk. Re-verification ensures seals, markings, and provenance remain intact. This reduces last-minute supply chain compromise. Periodic pedigree validation strengthens SCRM integrity.
|
| SPR-509 |
The [organization] shall procure flight items only from an AO-approved vetted supplier whitelist; off-list buys require documented risk acceptance and compensating pedigree/scanning.{SV-SP-4}{SR-4(4),SR-3,SR-5}
|
Restricting procurement to vetted suppliers reduces counterfeit and tampering risk. Off-list acquisitions require formal risk acceptance, preserving governance. Structured sourcing strengthens trust anchors. Controlled procurement reduces systemic exposure.
|
| SPR-514 |
The [spacecraft] shall emit a standardized accept/reject reason code for every telecommand, including mode/precondition results, parameter/range/sequence checks, and rate/temporal‑limit evaluations, and shall include the code in downlinked audit.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-3,AU-12}
|
Consistent reason codes enhance operator clarity and forensic traceability. Transparent rejection rationale reduces ambiguity. Downlinked codes support ground analysis. Deterministic feedback strengthens accountability.
|
| SPR-516 |
The [organization] shall define,and the [spacecraft] shall enforce,guardrails for any unauthenticated discovery beacons (if used), limiting content to non‑sensitive signals that cannot enable timing/key inference, preventing state change via those paths, narrowing content in safe mode, and validating behavior in simulators/flatsats.{SV-CF-2,SV-IT-1}{AC-4,AC-14}
|
Discovery mechanisms can leak sensitive timing or state information. Guardrails restrict beacon content to non-sensitive data. Controlled discovery reduces inference risk.
|
| SPR-517 |
The [organization] shall correlate station/operator session activity with pass schedules and spacecraft mode, alert on off‑schedule access and command families invalid for the current mode, and retain results as audit evidence.{SV-AC-4,SV-AC-1,SV-AV-4}{AC-17,AC-17(1),SI-4,AU-6}
|
Off-schedule or mode-inconsistent commands signal compromise. Correlation across dimensions strengthens anomaly detection. Audit retention supports post-event review. Context validation strengthens mission assurance.
|
| SPR-518 |
The [organization] shall require external stations/relays to complete an onboarding certification demonstrating operator/facility vetting, key custody and revocation practices, RF configuration discipline, time synchronization, and adherence to pass scheduling and emergency procedures, with periodic re‑certification.{SV-MA-7,SV-AC-4}{AC-17,AC-20,AC-20(1),SR-6}
|
Relay and partner stations expand trust boundaries. Certification ensures consistent security practices. Periodic re-validation prevents drift. External governance strengthens link integrity.
|
| SPR-519 |
The [spacecraft] shall cryptographically bind audit records to their origin using per‑record MACs/signatures or sequence‑linked hashes and include station/operator ID and selected RF/link indicators (e.g., SNR/BER, frame counters) when available; ground shall verify and log the results.{SV-IT-2,SV-AC-2,SV-DCO-1}{AU-3,AU-3(1),AU-9,AU-9(2),AU-10}
|
Per-record signatures prevent tampering or replay. Sequence linkage detects gaps. Including RF indicators enhances forensic value. Verified logging strengthens evidentiary integrity.
|
| SPR-520 |
The [spacecraft] shall implement tiered audit retention with overwrite protection for [organization]-defined high‑value categories (e.g., crypto events, command outcomes, mode changes) and expose buffer health/occupancy and retention decisions in telemetry; priorities shall be tunable by phase/mode.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-4,AU-4(1),AU-11}
|
High-value events require overwrite protection. Tunable priorities align storage with mission phase. Telemetry exposure ensures transparency. Structured retention strengthens audit survivability.
|
| SPR-521 |
The [spacecraft] shall prevent execution of [organization]-defined hazardous procedures when minimal auditing cannot be assured (e.g., verified buffer availability or local shadow log), while allowing essential safing actions; operator feedback shall distinguish “blocked due to no audit” from other rejects.{SV-AC-8,SV-DCO-1}{AC-3,AU-5,AU-5(2)}
|
Certain operations require audit traceability. Blocking when audit is unavailable prevents blind execution. Essential safing remains permitted. Conditional enforcement strengthens accountability.
|
| SPR-522 |
The [organization] shall implement a canonical time base and identifiers (station ID, session ID, command ID/APID, image/bitstream IDs) across TT&C front ends, consoles, and on‑board logs and shall de‑duplicate and gap‑detect during aggregation with rules for the source of truth for command history.{SV-IT-1,SV-AC-2,SV-DCO-1}{AU-6,AU-6(4),AU-8,IA-4}
|
Unified identifiers prevent ambiguity in command history. Gap detection identifies dropped or spoofed entries. Clear source-of-truth logic prevents dispute. Time discipline strengthens forensic precision.
|
| SPR-523 |
The [organization] shall define and implement a common audit schema for flight and ground that supports event tiering, consistent identifiers/time bases, and dynamic elevation/suppression of categories by phase/mode; ground aggregators shall normalize and integrity‑check records.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-1,AU-6,AU-12}
|
Normalization supports cross-domain correlation. Tiered categories enable adaptive visibility. Integrity checks prevent log injection. Structured schema strengthens systemic monitoring.
|
| SPR-524 |
The [spacecraft] shall protect on‑board audit storage using ECC and periodic scrubbing, commit markers/journaling to survive partial writes, redundant partitions/devices where available, and prioritized retention for high‑value events.{SV-IT-4,SV-DCO-1}{AU-9,AU-9(3)}
|
ECC and journaling preserve log integrity under fault. Redundant partitions improve survivability. Prioritized retention protects high-value evidence. Durable logging strengthens mission accountability.
|
| SPR-525 |
The [organization] shall enforce least privilege and separation of duties for audit data (distinct roles for viewing, exporting, administering logs), apply heightened protections to sensitive categories (e.g., crypto operations), and provide break‑glass pathways with strong auditing.{SV-AC-4}{AC-6,AU-9,AU-9(5)}
|
Separation of duties prevents misuse of logs. Break-glass pathways preserve emergency access with oversight. Heightened protections reduce tampering risk. Structured governance strengthens trust.
|
| SPR-527 |
The [organization] shall ingest vendor advisories, SBOM deltas, and provenance changes for components/toolchains into the Continuous Monitoring Program and correlate exposure with the “as‑flown” configuration to prioritize mitigations.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-4,SV-DCO-1}{CA-7,CA-7(6),CM-8}
|
Exposure must be evaluated against actual deployed versions. SBOM deltas enable precise mitigation prioritization. Continuous ingestion strengthens responsiveness. Configuration awareness improves risk management.
|
| SPR-528 |
The [organization] shall package each flight change (software, bitstreams, configuration tables) with a signed manifest, precondition checks (mode, power/thermal, link), explicit hold/commit points, and resumable procedures across AOS/LOS; the [spacecraft] shall enforce manifest checks prior to activation.{SV-SP-9,SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(2),SI-7,SA-10}
|
Manifest enforcement ensures integrity prior to activation. Precondition checks prevent unsafe changes. Resumable logic supports space contact constraints. Structured packaging strengthens update security.
|
| SPR-529 |
The [organization] shall define freeze windows around launch/maneuvers/high‑risk events, specify exception criteria and approvers, and require chunking, rate limits, checksum/signature gates, and telemetry cues that confirm final state when changes occur within a freeze.{SV-MA-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-3,CM-3(5),CM-5}
|
Operational stability requires disciplined change control. Freeze periods reduce compounding risk. Defined exceptions preserve agility. Structured boundaries protect mission safety.
|
| SPR-530 |
The [spacecraft] shall enable selected maintenance capabilities only within time‑bounded and mode‑bounded windows, audit enable/disable events, auto‑revert on timeout/reset, and expose enabled/disabled capability state in telemetry.{SV-AC-8,SV-AC-4}{CM-7,CM-7(2),SA-8,SA-8(14),AC-3}
|
Maintenance capabilities expand risk surface. Time-limited activation reduces abuse window. Telemetry exposure ensures oversight. Auto-revert strengthens containment.
|
| SPR-531 |
The [spacecraft] shall enforce whitelisting for executable images and mission scripts/procedures by ID, hash, or signature, accept only artifacts produced by the mission build pipeline, and constrain interpreters/macros to sandboxed contexts with provenance checks on inputs.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-7,CM-7(5),CM-7(8),SI-7}
|
Accepting only pipeline-produced artifacts prevents unauthorized code execution. Hash/signature validation ensures integrity. Sandbox constraints limit interpreter abuse. Provenance enforcement strengthens defense.
|
| SPR-534 |
The [organization] shall deploy deception/canary artifacts in ground TT&C environments (e.g., decoy credentials, fake repositories, canary procedures that never propagate to flight) and integrate alerts into incident handling; mechanisms shall not induce hazardous commanding.{SV-AC-4,SV-MA-7}{IR-4,IR-4(12),SI-4}
|
Canary artifacts reveal credential misuse or lateral movement. Integration with incident handling accelerates response. Mechanisms must not impact flight safety. Controlled deception strengthens detection.
|
| SPR-536 |
The [organization] shall capture on‑board and ground evidence, produce an “as‑run” timeline with decisions/assumptions, and feed findings into updated playbooks, training, twin/flatsat scenarios, risk registers, and baselines, verifying changes via rehearsal.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,CA-7}
|
Post-incident reconstruction improves institutional learning. Feeding findings into twins and training strengthens preparedness. Verification via rehearsal ensures improvement. Continuous feedback supports maturity.
|
| SPR-537 |
The [organization] shall define event‑driven triggers for rapid risk reassessment (e.g., new images/bitstreams, key rotations, partner‑station onboarding, notable anomalies, vendor advisories) and rehearse fast‑turn evaluations in a twin/flatsat to drive decisions within one or two passes.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-9}{RA-3,RA-3(1),CA-7}
|
Triggers ensure timely re-evaluation after impactful events. Flatsat rehearsal validates mitigation feasibility. Rapid cycles align with limited contact windows. Structured agility strengthens mission defense.
|
| SPR-538 |
The [spacecraft] shall budget CPU/power/memory for security functions (crypto, logging, verification), implement graceful degradation (e.g., summarize logs, throttle verification) that preserves TT&C and safing, and expose telemetry showing throttling decisions and residual capacity.{SV-AV-1,SV-DCO-1}{PE-9,SA-8(8),SC-6,CP-2}
|
Security must not starve essential TT&C. Explicit resource budgeting ensures sustained enforcement. Graceful degradation preserves mission priority. Telemetry visibility supports oversight.
|
| SPR-540 |
The [spacecraft] shall employ deterministic scheduling where feasible and bound retries/timeouts on command/telemetry paths by mode, exposing retry counters, backoff state, and finite‑state transitions in telemetry with consistent error/reject reason codes.{SV-IT-4,SV-AV-1}{SA-8(12),SI-10(3),SI-13}
|
Determinism prevents runaway retries or timing exploitation. Exposed counters support diagnosis. Finite-state transitions strengthen transparency. Predictable behavior improves assurance.
|
| SPR-541 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide a trusted path for sensitive actions (e.g., key management, image activation) with strengthened authentication/integrity checks, narrow interfaces, and explicit telemetry cues (trusted‑path active, preconditions satisfied); operations shall confirm trusted‑path use before proceeding.{SV-AC-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-8(13),SC-11,SC-12}
|
Narrow interfaces reduce attack vectors. Explicit trusted-path indicators prevent misuse. Strengthened authentication protects critical operations. Procedural confirmation ensures compliance.
|
| SPR-542 |
The [spacecraft] shall reserve CPU/memory/link budget for essential TT&C (command authentication, attitude/power control loops, critical telemetry) and preempt/shape payload and nonessential traffic under stress.{SV-AV-1,SV-AC-8}{SC-5,SC-5(2),SC-6,CP-10}
|
Command authentication and attitude control may take precedence. Traffic shaping prevents payload starvation attacks. Priority enforcement preserves safe operations. Resource governance strengthens availability.
|
| SPR-546 |
The [organization] shall restrict removable media and peripheral device use within TT&C enclaves to [organization]-approved cases, enforce port/media controls on modulation chains and control hosts, and re‑validate enable/disable states after maintenance.{SV-MA-7,SV-SP-4}{SC-41,MP-7}
|
Media introduces malware and exfiltration risk. Port controls limit unauthorized insertion. Re-validation ensures configuration integrity post-maintenance. Controlled access strengthens enclave protection.
|
| SPR-547 |
The [spacecraft] shall support chunked uploads of software/bitstreams/configuration with per‑chunk verification and commit markers, resumable across passes, with atomic activation and rollback if activation checks fail.{SV-SP-9,SV-IT-2}{SI-7,SI-7(15)}
|
Per-chunk verification prevents partial corruption. Atomic activation avoids inconsistent states. Rollback ensures safe recovery. Structured update logic strengthens resilience.
|
| SPR-548 |
The [spacecraft] shall retire superseded images, keys, and parameter sets using cryptographic erasure or verified wipe where supported, retain only golden and current versions needed for rollback, and expose an inventory of active/staged artifacts in telemetry.{SV-SP-9}{SI-2(6)}
|
Cryptographic erasure prevents legacy exploitation. Limiting retained versions reduces attack surface. Telemetry exposure ensures awareness. Controlled lifecycle management strengthens integrity.
|
| SPR-549 |
The [spacecraft] shall enforce memory‑protection hardening on flight processors (MPU/MMU isolation of partitions, W^X/no‑execute, stack canaries) and employ ECC with periodic scrubbing for critical memories; partition health and protection status shall be exposed in telemetry.{SV-IT-4,SV-SP-4}{SI-16,SC-39}
|
MPU/MMU isolation prevents partition compromise. W^X and stack canaries mitigate exploitation. ECC with scrubbing preserves memory integrity. Exposed health telemetry strengthens monitoring.
|
| SPR-550 |
The [spacecraft] shall provide authenticated, auditable commands to inhibit or narrow subsystems/functions without risking loss of recovery paths, with explicit telemetry confirming resultant state; ground systems shall provide authenticated RF‑transmitter inhibits and rack‑level power controls with audit.{SV-AC-8,SV-MA-7}{PE-10,AC-6,AC-6(5),IA-2}
|
Controlled inhibit functions enable safe containment. Explicit telemetry confirms resultant state. Ground RF inhibits add physical-layer safety. Auditable containment strengthens operational control.
|