Gather Spacecraft Communications Information: Communications Equipment

Adversaries inventory space and ground RF equipment to infer capabilities, limits, and attack surfaces. On the spacecraft, they seek antenna type and geometry, placement and boresight constraints, polarization, RF front-end chains, transponder type, translation factors, gain control, saturation points, and protective features. On the ground, they collect dish size/aperture efficiency, feed/polarizer configuration, tracking modes, diversity sites, and backend modem settings. Beacon frequency/structure, telemetry signal type, symbol rates, and framing reveal demodulator parameters and help an actor build compatible SDR pipelines. Knowledge of power budgets and AGC behavior enables strategies to push hardware into non-linear regimes, causing self-inflicted denial or intermodulation. Equipment location and mounting inform visibility and interference opportunities.

ID: REC-0003.01
Sub-technique of:  REC-0003
Notional Risk (H | M | L):  13 | 10 | 8
Tactic:
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2026/03/11

Countermeasures

ID Name Tiering Description NIST Rev5 ISO 27001 Onboard SV Ground
CM0001 Protect Sensitive Information Organizations should look to identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information (e.g., fault management approach) and apply access control accordingly. Any location (ground system, contractor networks, etc.) storing design information needs to ensure design info is protected from exposure, exfiltration, etc. Space system sensitive information may be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Company Proprietary. Space system sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, CUI, proprietary, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission. Sensitive documentation should only be accessed by personnel with defined roles and a need to know. Well established access controls (roles, encryption at rest and transit, etc.) and data loss prevention (DLP) technology are key countermeasures. The DLP should be configured for the specific data types in question. AC-25 AC-3(11) AC-4(23) AC-4(25) AC-4(6) CA-3 CM-12 CM-12(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) PM-11 PM-17 SA-3 SA-3(1) SA-3(2) SA-4(12) SA-5 SA-8 SA-8(19) SA-9(7) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SI-12 SI-21 SI-23 SR-12 SR-7 A.8.4 A.8.11 A.8.10 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.33 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.37 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 A.8.10 A.5.22
CM0005 Ground-based Countermeasures This countermeasure is focused on the protection of terrestrial assets like ground networks and development environments/contractor networks, etc. Traditional detection technologies and capabilities would be applicable here. Utilizing resources from NIST CSF to properly secure these environments using identify, protect, detect, recover, and respond is likely warranted. Additionally, NISTIR 8401 may provide resources as well since it was developed to focus on ground-based security for space systems (https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8401/final). Furthermore, the MITRE ATT&CK framework provides IT focused TTPs and their mitigations https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/enterprise/. Several recommended NIST 800-53 Rev5 controls are provided for reference when designing ground systems/networks. AC-1 AC-10 AC-11 AC-11(1) AC-12 AC-12(1) AC-14 AC-16 AC-16(6) AC-17 AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-17(3) AC-17(4) AC-17(6) AC-17(9) AC-18 AC-18(1) AC-18(3) AC-18(4) AC-18(5) AC-19 AC-19(5) AC-2 AC-2(1) AC-2(11) AC-2(12) AC-2(13) AC-2(2) AC-2(3) AC-2(9) AC-20 AC-20(1) AC-20(2) AC-20(3) AC-20(5) AC-21 AC-22 AC-3 AC-3(11) AC-3(13) AC-3(15) AC-3(4) AC-4 AC-4(23) AC-4(24) AC-4(25) AC-4(26) AC-4(31) AC-4(32) AC-6 AC-6(1) AC-6(10) AC-6(2) AC-6(3) AC-6(5) AC-6(8) AC-6(9) AC-7 AC-8 AT-2(4) AT-2(5) AT-2(6) AT-3 AT-3(2) AT-4 AU-10 AU-11 AU-12 AU-12(1) AU-12(3) AU-14 AU-14(1) AU-14(3) AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(1) AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6 AU-6(1) AU-6(3) AU-6(4) AU-6(5) AU-6(6) AU-7 AU-7(1) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) AU-9(4) CA-3 CA-3(6) CA-3(7) CA-7 CA-7(1) CA-7(6) CA-8 CA-8(1) CA-9 CM-10(1) CM-11 CM-11(2) CM-11(3) CM-12 CM-12(1) CM-14 CM-2 CM-2(2) CM-2(3) CM-2(7) CM-3 CM-3(1) CM-3(2) CM-3(4) CM-3(5) CM-3(6) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) CM-4 CM-5(1) CM-5(5) CM-6 CM-6(1) CM-6(2) CM-7 CM-7(1) CM-7(2) CM-7(3) CM-7(5) CM-7(8) CM-7(9) CM-8 CM-8(1) CM-8(2) CM-8(3) CM-8(4) CM-9 CP-10 CP-10(2) CP-10(4) CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(5) CP-2(8) CP-3(1) CP-4(1) CP-4(2) CP-4(5) CP-8 CP-8(1) CP-8(2) CP-8(3) CP-8(4) CP-8(5) CP-9 CP-9(1) CP-9(2) CP-9(3) IA-11 IA-12 IA-12(1) IA-12(2) IA-12(3) IA-12(4) IA-12(5) IA-12(6) IA-2 IA-2(1) IA-2(12) IA-2(2) IA-2(5) IA-2(6) IA-2(8) IA-3 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(1) IA-5(13) IA-5(14) IA-5(2) IA-5(7) IA-5(8) IA-6 IA-7 IA-8 IR-2 IR-2(2) IR-2(3) IR-3 IR-3(1) IR-3(2) IR-3(3) IR-4 IR-4(1) IR-4(10) IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(13) IR-4(14) IR-4(3) IR-4(4) IR-4(5) IR-4(6) IR-4(7) IR-4(8) IR-5 IR-5(1) IR-6 IR-6(1) IR-6(2) IR-7 IR-7(1) IR-8 MA-2 MA-3 MA-3(1) MA-3(2) MA-3(3) MA-4 MA-4(1) MA-4(3) MA-4(6) MA-4(7) MA-5(1) MA-6 MA-7 MP-2 MP-3 MP-4 MP-5 MP-6 MP-6(3) MP-7 PE-3(7) PL-10 PL-11 PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PL-9 PM-11 PM-16(1) PM-17 PM-30 PM-30(1) PM-31 PM-32 RA-10 RA-3(1) RA-3(2) RA-3(3) RA-3(4) RA-5 RA-5(10) RA-5(11) RA-5(2) RA-5(4) RA-5(5) RA-7 RA-9 SA-10 SA-10(1) SA-10(2) SA-10(7) SA-11 SA-11(2) SA-11(4) SA-11(7) SA-11(9) SA-15 SA-15(3) SA-15(7) SA-17 SA-2 SA-22 SA-3 SA-3(1) SA-3(2) SA-4 SA-4(1) SA-4(10) SA-4(12) SA-4(2) SA-4(3) SA-4(5) SA-4(7) SA-4(9) SA-5 SA-8 SA-8(14) SA-8(15) SA-8(18) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SA-8(24) SA-8(29) SA-8(9) SA-9 SA-9(1) SA-9(2) SA-9(6) SA-9(7) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-15 SC-16(2) SC-16(3) SC-18(1) SC-18(2) SC-18(3) SC-18(4) SC-2 SC-2(2) SC-20 SC-21 SC-22 SC-23 SC-23(1) SC-23(3) SC-23(5) SC-24 SC-28 SC-28(1) SC-28(3) SC-3 SC-38 SC-39 SC-4 SC-45 SC-45(1) SC-45(2) SC-49 SC-5 SC-5(1) SC-5(2) SC-5(3) SC-50 SC-51 SC-7 SC-7(10) SC-7(11) SC-7(12) SC-7(13) SC-7(14) SC-7(18) SC-7(21) SC-7(25) SC-7(29) SC-7(3) SC-7(4) SC-7(5) SC-7(7) SC-7(8) SC-7(9) SC-8 SC-8(1) SC-8(2) SC-8(5) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(6) SI-11 SI-12 SI-14(3) SI-16 SI-19(4) SI-2 SI-2(2) SI-2(3) SI-2(6) SI-21 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(12) SI-4(13) SI-4(14) SI-4(15) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(20) SI-4(22) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-5 SI-5(1) SI-6 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(17) SI-7(2) SI-7(5) SI-7(7) SI-7(8) SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(1) SR-11(2) SR-11(3) SR-12 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(1) SR-3(2) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 SR-6(1) SR-7 SR-8 SR-9 SR-9(1) 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.15 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.16 A.5.18 A.8.2 A.8.16 A.5.15 A.5.33 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.18 A.8.20 A.8.2 A.8.4 A.5.14 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.11 A.8.10 A.5.15 A.8.2 A.8.18 A.8.5 A.8.5 A.7.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.7.9 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.7.9 A.8.20 A.6.3 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.5.25 A.6.8 A.8.15 A.7.4 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.5.28 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.14 A.8.21 9.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 A.5.36 9.2.2 A.8.9 A.8.9 8.1 9.3.3 A.8.9 A.8.32 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.8.19 A.5.9 A.8.9 A.5.2 A.8.9 A.8.19 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.30 A.5.30 A.5.29 A.7.11 A.5.29 A.5.33 A.8.13 A.5.29 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.8.5 A.5.16 A.6.3 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.8.16 A.5.5 A.6.8 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.24 A.7.10 A.7.13 A.8.10 A.8.10 A.8.16 A.8.10 A.7.13 A.5.10 A.7.7 A.7.10 A.5.13 A.5.10 A.7.7 A.7.10 A.8.10 A.5.10 A.7.9 A.7.10 A.5.10 A.7.10 A.7.14 A.8.10 A.5.10 A.7.10 A.5.8 A.5.7 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 4.4 6.2 7.4 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 9.1 9.2.2 10.1 10.2 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.22 A.5.7 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.33 8.1 A.5.8 A.5.20 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.28 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.37 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.25 A.8.27 A.8.6 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.23 A.8.12 A.5.10 A.5.14 A.8.20 A.8.26 A.5.33 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.14 A.5.10 A.5.33 A.6.8 A.8.8 A.8.32 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.5.6 A.8.11 A.8.10 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 A.5.22
CM0029 TRANSEC Utilize TRANSEC in order to prevent interception, disruption of reception, communications deception, and/or derivation of intelligence by analysis of transmission characteristics such as signal parameters or message externals. For example, jam-resistant waveforms can be utilized to improve the resistance of radio frequency signals to jamming and spoofing. Note: TRANSEC is that field of COMSEC which deals with the security of communication transmissions, rather than that of the information being communicated. AC-17 AC-18 AC-18(5) CA-3 CP-8 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(19) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-40 SC-40(1) SC-40(3) SC-40(4) SC-5 SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SC-8(4) A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.29 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.33