a. Test the contingency plan for the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using the following tests to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the readiness to execute the plan: [Assignment: organization-defined tests]. b. Review the contingency plan test results; and c. Initiate corrective actions, if needed.
ID | Name | Description | D3FEND | |
CM0008 | Security Testing Results | As penetration testing and vulnerability scanning is a best practice, protecting the results from these tests and scans is equally important. These reports and results typically outline detailed vulnerabilities and how to exploit them. As with countermeasure CM0001, protecting sensitive information from disclosure to threat actors is imperative. | D3-AI D3-AVE |
ID | Description | |
SV-MA-2 |
Heaters and flow valves of the propulsion subsystem are controlled by electric signals so cyberattacks against these signals could cause propellant lines to freeze, lock valves, waste propellant or even put in de-orbit or unstable spinning |
|
SV-AV-4 |
Attacking the scheduling table to affect tasking |
|
SV-MA-3 |
Attacks on critical software subsystems Attitude Determination and Control (AD&C) subsystem determines and controls the orientation of the satellite. Any cyberattack that could disrupt some portion of the control loop - sensor data, computation of control commands, and receipt of the commands would impact operations Telemetry, Tracking and Commanding (TT&C) subsystem provides interface between satellite and ground system. Computations occur within the RF portion of the TT&C subsystem, presenting cyberattack vector Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem is the brains of the satellite. It interfaces with other subsystems, the payload, and the ground. It receives, validate, decodes, and sends commands to other subsystems, and it receives, processes, formats, and routes data for both the ground and onboard computer. C&DH has the most cyber content and is likely the biggest target for cyberattack. Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) provides, stores, distributes, and controls power on the satellite. An attack on EPS could disrupt, damage, or destroy the satellite. |
|
SV-AC-8 |
Malicious Use of hardware commands - backdoors / critical commands |
|
SV-AV-2 |
Satellites base many operations on timing especially since many operations are automated. Cyberattack to disrupt timing/timers could affect the vehicle (Time Jamming / Time Spoofing) |
|
SV-AV-3 |
Affect the watchdog timer onboard the satellite which could force satellite into some sort of recovery mode/protocol |
|
SV-AV-5 |
Using fault management system against you. Understanding the fault response could be leveraged to get satellite in vulnerable state. Example, safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of TLM to cause action from ground, or some sort of RPO to cause S/C to go into safe mode; |
|
SV-IT-1 |
Communications system spoofing resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity |
|
SV-AV-1 |
Communications system jamming resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity |
|
SV-MA-6 |
Not planning for security on SV or designing in security from the beginning |
|
SV-SP-2 |
Testing only focuses on functional requirements and rarely considers end to end or abuse cases |
Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
---|---|
The [organization] shall test the contingency plan, with special consideration for space operations, to determine the effectiveness of the plan and readiness to execute the plan.{CP-4} |
ID | Name | Description | |
---|---|---|---|
REC-0008 | Gather Supply Chain Information | Threat actors may gather information about a mission's supply chain or product delivery mechanisms that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. | |
REC-0008.03 | Known Vulnerabilities | Threat actors may gather information about vulnerabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. A vulnerability is a weakness in the victim spacecraft's hardware, subsystems, bus, or software that can, potentially, be exploited by a threat actor to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. During reconnaissance as threat actors identify the types/versions of software (i.e., COTS, open-source) being used, they will look for well-known vulnerabilities that could affect the spacecraft. Threat actors may find vulnerability information by searching leaked documents, vulnerability databases/scanners, compromising ground systems, and searching through online databases. | |
EX-0009 | Exploit Code Flaws | Threats actors may identify and exploit flaws or weaknesses within the software running on-board the target spacecraft. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components. | |
EX-0009.03 | Known Vulnerability (COTS/FOSS) | Threat actors may utilize knowledge of the spacecraft software composition to enumerate and exploit known flaws or vulnerabilities in the commercial or open source software running on-board the target spacecraft. |