Control physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using [Assignment: organization-defined security controls].
| ID | Name | Description | D3FEND | |
| CM0071 | Communication Physical Medium | Establish alternate physical medium for networking based on threat model/environment. For example, fiber optic cabling is commonly perceived as a better choice in lieu of copper for mitigating network security concerns (i.e., eavesdropping / traffic flow analysis) and this is because optical connections transmit data using light, they don’t radiate signals that can be intercepted. | D3-MH D3-PLM | |
| ID | Description | |
| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| EXF-0002 | Side-Channel Exfiltration | Information is extracted not by reading files or decrypting frames but by observing physical or protocol byproducts of computation, power draw, electromagnetic emissions, timing, thermal signatures, or traffic patterns. Repeated measurements create distinctive fingerprints correlated with internal states (key use, table loads, parser branches, buffer occupancy). Matching those fingerprints to models or templates yields sensitive facts without direct access to the protected data. In space systems, vantage points span proximity assets (for EM/thermal), ground testing and ATLO (for direct probing), compromised on-board modules that can sample rails or sensors, and remote observation of link-layer timing behaviors. | |
| EXF-0002.03 | Traffic Analysis Attacks | In a terrestrial environment, threat actors use traffic analysis attacks to analyze traffic flow to gather topological information. This traffic flow can divulge information about critical nodes, such as the aggregator node in a sensor network. In the space environment, specifically with relays and constellations, traffic analysis can be used to understand the energy capacity of spacecraft node and the fact that the transceiver component of a spacecraft node consumes the most power. The spacecraft nodes in a constellation network limit the use of the transceiver to transmit or receive information either at a regulated time interval or only when an event has been detected. This generally results in an architecture comprising some aggregator spacecraft nodes within a constellation network. These spacecraft aggregator nodes are the sensor nodes whose primary purpose is to relay transmissions from nodes toward the ground station in an efficient manner, instead of monitoring events like a normal node. The added functionality of acting as a hub for information gathering and preprocessing before relaying makes aggregator nodes an attractive target to side channel attacks. A possible side channel attack could be as simple as monitoring the occurrences and duration of computing activities at an aggregator node. If a node is frequently in active states (instead of idle states), there is high probability that the node is an aggregator node and also there is a high probability that the communication with the node is valid. Such leakage of information is highly undesirable because the leaked information could be strategically used by threat actors in the accumulation phase of an attack. | |
| EXF-0004 | Out-of-Band Communications Link | Some missions field secondary links, separate frequencies and hardware, for limited, purpose-built functions (e.g., rekeying, emergency commanding, beacons, custodial crosslinks). Adversaries co-opt these channels as covert data paths: embedding content in maintenance messages, beacon fields, or low-rate housekeeping; initiating vendor/service modes that carry file fragments; or switching to contingency profiles that bypass normal routing and monitoring. Because these paths are distinct from the main TT&C and may be sparsely supervised, they provide discreet avenues to move data off the spacecraft or to external relays without altering the primary link’s traffic patterns. | |